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The Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron began its active
deployments to the Indian Ocean in 196 8. This led to a
wide-ranging debate as to its purpose , which could be
active or reactive in nature . To deal properly with the
Squadron, it is important for the planner to understand
the difference between the two.
This thesis examines the broad range of theorized
missions for the Squadron. These Western theories are
compared to determine the relative merits of each. A very
select number of Soviet writers' works are examined for any
correlation with the Western theories. This is set against
the background of a historical survey of U.S. and Soviet
naval relations in the region. The results of these
comparisons lead to the conclusion that the Squadron's
mission is both active and reactive, and that most of the
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron's (SNIOS,
or the Squadron) active deployments began in 1968, there has
been an cngcing debate as to its purpose. This thesis will
summarize the various positions in the debate, and determine
whether the available evidence supports or discredits one
theory or another.
There are two bread categories into which the Squadron's
missions may fall: active and reactive. An active mission
is one which is preplanned, in pursuit of larger and
longer-range goals. An example of an active missicn is the
Squadron's visitation of Indian Ocean ports in pursuit of
increased political influence for the Soviet Union in the
third world. Conversely, a reactive mission is one which is
triggered ty an event or circumstance. The theory that the
Squadron v»as formed in 1968 in reaction to the U.S. Navy's
Indian Ocean presence would indicate a reactive mission.
It is recognized that naval forces inherently fulfill
both active and reactive missions. This is particularly
true wher one realizes that one of the most important
preplanned missions of a naval force is to prepare for and
react to circumstances and events as necessary. The active
and reactive missions can be visualized as a continuum with
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an active mission a* one and, and a reactive mission at the
ether. At any given moment, the objective of a naval force
will fall somewhere en that continuum.
To the degree that the Squadron's mission is active, the
planner, knowing the missions and having at his disposal
some historical referents, can predict the operations of the
Squadron with a reasonable degree of certainty and reli-
ability, and can then incorporate this predictive capability
into D.S. planning. To the degree that the Squadron's role
is reactive, however, the planner is in a much more tenuous
predictive position. It is important to first determine
what the Squadron is reacting to. If it is reacting to a
U.S. military presence in the region, then the planner can
anticipate the reaction, and take it into account." If,
however, it is reacting to an independent event in the
Indian Ocean littoral, which includes a large portion of the
third world, a reasonable predictive capability can only be
maintained if the events themselves can be predicted, or the
reaction patterns to surprises can be discerned.
In order that the a.S. naval planner can adequately
account for the SNIOS then, three questions have to be
answered:
1. To what degree is the Squadron's mission active, or
reactive?




3. To the degree that it is reactive, what is it
reacting to, and what patterns, if any, can be
discerned?
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will
take four parts. First, a historical survey will be made of
the U.S. and Soviet naval relations and force levels in the
Indian Ocean. Second, U.S. literature on the subject of
Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean will be selec-
tively surveyed to determine the range of active missions
theorized or recognized by U.S. writers. The ideas put
forward by the different authors will be situated in such a
framework as tc place competing arguments against each
ether, tc see if the arguments of one may be dismissed
through the logic of another. In this manner, the arguments
of each author will be used as evidence to support or refute
the others. Third, the U.S. literature will be surveyed to
determine the range cf reactive missions theorized or recog-
nized by the U.S. writers, again using the authors as under
active missions.
Fcurth, a sample of Soviet writings on the Indian Ocean
will be reviewed. The risk in reviewing Soviet literature
is understood. It is believed, however, that if the Soviets
themselves say they have a certain mission in the region,
then it should be taken seriously, if not accepted verbatim.
The literature is reviewed in order to grasp the essence of
Soviet writings en the region, and to determine if their is
12

any correlation between U.S. theories on their presence in
the Indian Ocean, and stated Soviet interests and objectives
there
.
The discovery of any correlations, or lack of thereof,
will then produce a statement, of determination of the
general mission structure of the Squadron. The statement of
general mission structure will be followed by recommenda-
tions for U.S. planners with respect to the best way to take
the Squadron into account.
13

II. HISTORY „AND_ FORCE, .LEVELS
The Soviets began their regular naval deployments in







1/3 to 1/2 of these units were warships. The increase
in 1972 was due to the Indo-Pakistani War and the Chittagcng
mine-clearing operations. [Ref. 1 ]. During OKEAN-75, the
Soviet Arabian Sea units operated with IL-38s from Berbera,
and TD-95s from central Asia. [Ref. 2]-
The following is Watson's analysis of the standard
Indian Ocean Squadron of 20-22 ships, from 1968-1980:
1 cruiser
2 destroyers









1 hydrographic research ship [Ref. 3].
In ship-days, the Squadron's presence was:
1. 1968 = 1,200
2. 1974 = 10 r500
3. 1975-1979 = 7,000-3,000
4. 1980 = 1 1 ,800. i [Ref. 4].
Other estimates cf the average makeup of the Squadron
appear to compare pretty closely with Watson's analysis.
Nitze and Sullivan estimate the normal deployment to be 8-10
combatants and 10 replenishment and stores ships. [Ref. 5].
Stone's analysis shewed the Soviets usually having 20-24
ships in the rsgion, with 1/3 to 1/2 being combatants,
including guided missile ships, ASW ships, and submarines.
[Ref. 6].
The O.S. Middle East Porce began its presence in 1949.
The Seventh Fleet began deployents to the Indian Ocean in
1964 with the Concord CV task force. [Ref. 7]. Occasional
'excursions • into the Indian ocean were made in the early
and mid-1970s by Seventh Fleet units consisting either of an
aircraft carrier and escorts or several cruiser-destroyer
type ships with a squadron commander embarked. These always
stayed a few months and then departed. Near-continucus U.S.
*The increase in 1974 was due mainly to the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, as well as indicating the early buildup to
the present "normal" squadron force level. The increase in
1980 was due to the Iranian crisis.
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naval ship deployments to the Indian Ocean (other than the
ever-present Middle East Force) began in November of 1978.
A group around USS Sterett (CG-31) entered in November of
that year. [Ref. 8]. Up to 27 0.3. Navy warships were on
patrol and exercising in the area, under sea and air
surveillance, in 1978. [Sef. 9].
Then, with the fall of the Shah of Iran in January,
1979, the naval situation in the Indian Ocean began to heat
up drastically. In May 1979, the Somali port of Berbera had
its first visit by a U.S. warship. Until this time, the
U.S. had declined tc take advantage of Somalia's offers of
port access. The coincidence of this first U.S. visit, so
soon after the fall of the Shah probably indicates a shift
in U.S. policy, searching for a new regional strategy. The
Soviet Kiev-class carrier Minsk was concurrently conducting
exercises off the coast of the PDRY for the benefit of local
officials. The Minsk eventually moved on to the Pacific
Fleet. [Ref. 10].
During the Iranian crisis, the Soviets had more than 20
ships in the Indian Ocean, over three times the U.S. pres-
ence. [Ref. 11]. From 1970-1979, the Soviet to U.S.
ship-days ratio has been 3-4: 1, not including submarines.
[Ref. 12]. In 1979, the option of forming a U.S. Fifth
Fleet in the Indian Ocean was being discussed. In late
February, 1979, National Security Advisor Brzezinski pushed
for an increased military presence in the Indian Ocean.
16

Through the spring of 1979, the U.S. focused on the presence
cf naval forces in the Indian Ocean rather than look for
possible bases ashore. The Soviet anion maintained 18-20
ships in the Indian Ocean in addition to the ships it sent
to the South China Sea as a show of support for Vietnam in
irs border war with the P RC in 1979. [Ref. 13]. What
became known as the Carter Doctrine was announced in the
State of the Union message to the Congress on 23 January,
1980, about one month after Soviet forces invaded
Afghanistan. This speech stated that the U.S. considered
the Persian Gulf region as an area of vital interest, and
that it would defend it with whatever means necessary,
including military fcrce.
On 8 March 1979, USS Constellation (CV-64) was ordered
to the Indian Ocean. By 6 April, the combined Indian
Ocean-Middle East Force strength amounted to 15 ships. Seme
were Intended to shew support for North Yemen in their war
against the PDRY. In October 1979, the U.S. Middle East
Force was expanded by two destroyers, and the number of
annual task force deployments was increased from three to
four. In December 1S79, there were 19 U.S. warships in the
Arabian Sea, including two CVs. [Ref- 1**]- The embassy in
Iran was seized on <* November 1979. By the end of the
month, the total U.S.N. ship strength in the region had
grown to 21. At least two carrier battle groups would be
maintained in the Indian Ocean for the two years subseguent
17

to the seizure of the embassy. The total O.S.N. ship count
reached 21 en 16 March 1980 with the arrival of a Seventh
Fleet MAO. This was the first of four such task groups to
deploy to the Indian Ocean, resulting in a Navy-Marine
amphibious team on station almost continuously until March,
1981. By the end of April 1980, the O.S.N. had 37 ships
deployed in the area, 22 of which were combatants. It
stayed at about this level until March, 1981. Two CVBGs
were maintained until 21 October 198 1, when force strength
dropped to one battle group, a level which is still main-
tained. Amphibious ready group deployments are regular, but
short-lived. Indian Ocean deployments are losing their
urgency with the decrease in the crisis level there, and the
increase in crisis levels elsewhere in the world.
[Ref. 15].
The Soviet squadron averaged about 20 ships until the
crisis of 1979-80 when the average was about 30. [Ref. 16].
The Soviet force level was raised from 22 to 32 ships 26
March 1978. [Ref. 17], In August, 1979, a submarine
tender, alcng with an Echo-II class submarine entered Aden.
[Ref. 18]. In 1980, a massive increase in Soviet submarine
operations was observed in the Indian Ocean, probably in
reaction to the turbulent events in the Middle East, and the
increased American presence. Prior to 1980, Soviet subma-
rine patrols had been limited to one diesel boat plus a four
and cne-haif month annual excursion by an older nuclear
18

submarine from their Facific Fleet. The year 1980, however,
brought a nearly continuous Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine
presence, an increase in diesel patrols, and two
'Victcr' -class submarines from their Northern Fleet assets
in the area. [Ref. 19].
By mid-1982, Soviet ship count averaged about 25 and
by year's end had fallen to approximately 20, with not
more than two majcr surface combatants in the area for
any sustained period. Within the first zvo months of
1983, the Soviats were maintaining only about 15 ships
in the Indian Ocean, including a 'Kashin' -class guided
missile destroyer and an 'Echo II 1 submarine. Most of
the remaining ships are of the small auxiliary variety.
[Ref. 20].
Although the Suez Canal is now open, making the area
•east cf Suez* more accessible to the Soviet Black Sea
Fleet, the majority of Soviet ships which deploy to the
Indian Ocean make the long trip from the Pacific Ocean
Fleet. [Ref. 21]. Through 1978, most Soviet naval shipping
through the Suez canal was noncombattant . Due to bad rela-
tions with Egypt, the Soviets may not be able to count en it
in a crisis. [Ref. 22].
The Soviet Navy also operates four permanent anchorages
in the Indian Ocean: near Socotra Island off the African
Horn; near the Comoro Islands between Tanzania and the
Malagasey Republic; along the Cargados Carajos Shoals near
Mauritius; and in the Chagos Archipelago near the U.S.
facility on Diego Garcia. The Soviets also maintain
'bunkering rights' for naval auxiliaries (not combatants)
with Mauritius and Singapore. [Ref. 23]. For limited
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purposes, they can use Aden in the PDRY, Uram Qasr Iraq, Pert
Louis Mauritius, and Eeira and Maputo Mozambique. They also
occasionally use an anchorage off the Malidives. [Ref- 24].
Soviet supply points include Vietnam, Laos, Singapore,
India, Iraq, the PDRY, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Mauritius,
giving them a logistics string from Vietnam to the South
African Cape. [Ref- 25].
There was some indication that the Russians may have
intended originally to deploy a larger force to the
Indian Ccean. The now defunct Soviet naval forces at
Berbera in Somalia appear to have been designed to
support a much larger naval force than the Russians
normally deploy there. [Ref- 26].
With their expulsion from Berbera, they lest a lot
of important items which have not been immediately replace-
able. They had an airbase at Mogadishu, which was 1,000
miles south of Aden. So, in losing access to Somalia, they
lost an extended finger of power to the sourh in 1977.
[Ref- 27].
Soviet forces are now building naval facilities on the
Dahlak archipelago, 50 miles off the coast of Ethiopia's
major port of Massawa and 250 miles north of the Bab al
Mandeb Straits. There has been considerable Soviet naval
and construction activity there. A berthing area has been
built with a large pier, and a floating dry dock is moored
in the channel. This dry dock had originally been moved to
Aden after the Soviet expulsion from Berbera. The Soviets
are building additional facilities on Perim Island in the
20

Eab al Mandeb straits. [Hef. 28]. The Soviets presently
keep U 11-38 May aircraft in the PDRY, and 2 in Ethiopia.
[Ref. 29].
Conditions within the Indian Ocean basin makes many
naval operations more difficult than under normal conditions
elsewhere. Naval operations are hindered by extremely high
salinity and high water temperatures in the northern reaches
of the Indian Seas, while unusually low salinity is found on
the eastern boundary. There are anomalously deep and
shallow channels, and abnormally high sound velocities.
Underwater sound prcpogation is subjected to complex and
irregular perturbations. In coastal areas, extremely high
temperatures and severe dust storms are common. [Hef. 30].
The importance of recognizing the Indian Ocean's
peculiar qualities and their influence on undersea communi-
cations, detection, and ranging cannot be overemphasized.
This could confound Soviet ASW efforts, but they probably
have the best survey data of any nation due to the great




HI- U.S. THEORIES; ACTIVE MISSIONS
This chapter will incorporate a selected sample of U.S.
writers* theories of the active missions of the Squadron.
The intention of the selection is to present the broad range
cf theories rather than to concentrate on one or two of the
most popular.
A. DISRUPTION OF WESTERS SLOCS
The Squadron has a mission to disrupt/interdict Western
sea lines cf communication (SLOCs) , specifically the oil
routes leading from the Persian Gulf to the U.S., Western
Europe, and Japan. [Ref. 31]. .The scenario projected here
is that the Soviets could disrupt shipping using raider
tactics similar to those tried by the Germans in WWII, or
could mine or blockade the straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb,
or Malacca using surface ships, submarines, or aircraft. It
implies a Soviet desire to impose economic sanctions on the
West. Soviet leaders clearly stated during the Khrushchev
era that one of the Soviet Navy's primary missions in any
future war would be to stop the flow of vital merchant
cargcs to Western nations on the continent and to England,
including irreplaceable material from the United States and
oil frcm the Middle East. [Ref- 39]. This would intimidate
22

rations like Japan, who are wholly dapendent on oil passing
through the Indian Ocean.
The positions of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean seem
to indicate a desire to stand astride the SLOCs leading from
the Red Sea and the Fersian Gulf. The proclamation of the
state of the People 1 s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in
November 1967 and of Socialist Ethiopia in 1977 gave the
Soviets a position in the northwest quadrant of the Indian
Ocean, centered on Sccotra Island, and in the Red Sea. This
position is ideally situated to interdict supertanker
traffic from the Persian Gulf. With the increasing impor-
tance of the crude oil shipping lanes, and the reduction of
importance of the Suez Canal due to the introduction of
supertankers, the political climate in the Indian Ocean took
on an explosive atmosphere [Hef. 40].
With respect to numbers of submarines, the Soviets are
in a stronger position than were the Germans at the start of
WWII. The Soviets are in an improving position with respect
to access to facilities, and the concurrent eroding of O.S.
access. If the Soviets can cut the sea routes around the
Cape and starve NATC of oil, the only response would be
nuclear war or surrender, because NATO today is too weak and
too unprepared to offer effective conventional resistance.
[Ref. 11 ]. The expansion of the Soviet fleet is particu-
larly apparent in the Indian Ocean. The Squadron conducted
simulated antishipping maneuvers there during OKEAN 75
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exercises. The security of the West as a whole is thus
endangered so long as the Western world depends so heavily
on Middle Eastern oil.
The negative response to this scenario [Ref. 42]. is
guite convincing. A Soviet blockade is neither conceivable
outside the context cf a general 2ast-West war, or a cost-
effective way of threatening the West's oil line. There is
a current excess capacity in the world tanker fleet. A
blockade would bring even enemies together against the
Soviets, in a coalition of states with an interest in the
continued flow cf cil (bcth buyers and sellers). The
Soviets would fight alone. Since a blockade could easily
escalate tc general war, the presence of a substantial
proporticn cf the Scviet Navy in the Indian Ocean rather
than in the approaches to the Soviet Union would constitute
inconceivable strategic folly. The Cape route is sometimes
listed as a bottleneck, due to the African landmass and
weather, [Bef. 47]. but in fact, it is not so, except that
merchant shipping cuts corners in order to save time. The
Soviets also depend en Indian Ocean SLOCs to resupply their
Far Eastern forces and their Vietnamese allies, and would
therefore be hesitant to invite Western retaliation against
them.
There are a number of problems confronting the Scviet
Admiral contemplating an interdiction campaign or blockade
cf Western SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. South of the Strait,
24

the SLOCs spread out, including the turn around the Cape of
Good Hope. Because the best weapon for carrying out an
anti-SLOC campaign is the submarine, it is apparent that the
Soviet Navy would have to be augmented by numerous, cheap
submarines to carry cut the campaign. The campaign would
talcs more than the average 20-22 ships normally deployed to
the Indian Ocean, and would require a major base; more than
the anchorages and access agreements they presently enjoy.
Due tc their lack of sufficient basing arrangements, they
must limit their operations to areas in close proximity to
the Soviet landmass in order to have access to adequate air
cover. Without this air cover, their ships would be vulner-
able, and a carrier tattls group could destroy the bases and
forces, thereby protecting the SLOCs.
As West German Admiral Edward Wegener points out, they
would also need mere than just support facilities.
[Ref. 48]. According to Wegener, present Soviet facilities,
etc in the Indian Ocean constituta maritime positions vice
strategic positions. Soviet Indian Ocean positions are cut
off from the Soviet land mass by the Dardanelles, the Sixth
Fleet, and the Suez Canal. In case of a war, the Squadron
would dry up, though extended facilities could prolong their
capabilities somewhat. Because of this, the Squadron must




The global picture must also be considered. Originally,
the Scviet Navy developed in response to the nuclear threat
from American carriers and SLBMs. Thus, its primary mission
is the strategic protection of the Soviet heartland. To
deploy their submarine fleet off the Cape, they would have
to accept a fundamental weakening in their capacity to carry
cut this primary strategic responsiblity . And, since inter-
diction cculd lead to a general war with the West, including
possibly a nuclear war, they must be ready to effect their
strategic defense of the primary theatre of the central
front
.
If the Soviets wanted to interdict the oil SLOCs to the
West from the Persian Gulf, there are more efficient means
for them to do so than to mount a naval blockade from ports
in the Horn of Africa and/cr southern Africa. They could
sabotage cr bomb directly:
1. The small number of oil fields,
2. The even smaller number of power sources for the
pumps and separators,
3. The even smaller number yet of collection points for
tankers,
4. Or, the one Strait of Hormuz. [Ref. 49].
The most important thing to understand is that the sea lanes
themselves are just one part of the transshipment line
between the Middle Eastern wells and the Western consumers.
There are eight major locations where the
26

transshipment could fce interrupted, and the sea lanes are
the least vulnerable cf then all, at present. [Ref. 50].
Fcssifcly the best spot for interdiction is the Strait of
Hormuz. This is an especially attractive option following
the invasion of Afghanistan, which puts Soviet tactical
airpower within unrefueled range of the Gulf of Oman and -he
Hormuz strait. This power, in conjunction with Soviet naval
forces in the Indian Ccean, may "confer upon the Kremlin the
power to sever the West*s economic jugular in the Gulf."
[Ref. 51].
Iccking at the problem in a broader context, interdic-
tion in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic offers
"numerous advantages over an Indian Ocean exercise..."
[Ref. 52]. These locations offer shorter lines of supply,
vastly superior air cover, and easier access to major repair
facilities. The most important advantage of the
Mediterranean or North Atlantic over the Indian Ocean for
interdicting Western SLOCs, though, is that it is easier to
affect a rapid mission shift there from interdiction to
strategic defense. By placing their fleet in the North
Atlantic, they can defend Europe, they are closer to opera-
tional and logistic support, they can operate from more
interior lines, and they can still threaten to cut off the
oil tc the West.
27

According to Ltccl Thomas Johnson and Lcdr Raymond
Barrett, the Strait cf Hormuz is unlikely to be mined effec-
tively. [Ref. 53]. A leaking crude oil tanker is less
likely to take on water than it is to leak the oil. It is
messy , but the ship actually floats better. Depending on
the location of the explosicn with respect to the ship, you
get varying degrees cf damage effects, and many tankers have
ballasting and inerting systems to minimize explosive
damage. The psychological damage is quite often the
greatest gain of a mining effort. Modern mines use hydros-
tatic pressure, acoustic s«nsors, and magnetic signature
senscrs to activate them; and use intermittent activation
devices and ship counters tc counter sweeping efforts. "It
is reaching the point at which each mine must be individu-
ally located and disarmed or blown up." [Sef. 54]. Given
all the variables, the best estimate of a safe range from an
ordinary mine would be a minimum of about ten times the
draft of the ship. Cver ten times the draft of the ship is
the safe zone; four to ten times the ship's draft is the
damage zone; and zero tc three times the ship's draft is the
danger zone, still subject to the explosion's location with
respect tc the ship. The Strait of Hormuz is generally
about 300 feet deep along the Musandam Peninsula.
Therefore, hulls drawing from 10 to 75 feet are within the
damage range of the bottom. Moored mines are more
dangerous, because they defeat this depth calculation,
28

though they are easier to locate and to sweep. In addition,
the depth is such that the sinking of one ship in the Strait
cf Hcrmuz wculd not blcck, or seriously impede, shipping.
In fact, it would take a rather large number of strate-
gically placed sinkings to choke the channel. It is too
deep to effectively tcttom mine against any but the deepest
draft ships. Compared with other options for mine warfare
inside the Persian Gulf, Hormuz is a relatively poor place
to employ naval mines. There still isn't any cure, for the
psychclogical threat of mines, though education helps a
little. A final note on the straits is zhat they are also
too wide to be effectively controlled by coastal artillery.
[Eef. 55].
Admiral Wegener calls for caution with respect tc the
SLOCs, however. • If the Soviets could break through the
barriers between the Soviet landmass and their Indian Ocean
positions, they would become strategic positions, which
would be very dangerous, particularly in terms of a long war
scenario. This development of strategic positions wculd,
"lead tc a bread (Soviet) position from the Eastern
Mediterranean to India on which to build sea power and
limited mastery, depending on available resources."
[Ref. 56]. To this end, Wegener believes that the Eastern




The Gulf case demonstrates the close interplay between
the maritime posture and the balance of power on the land-
mass. A shift of the balance of land forces will have an
important and perhaps decisive impact on the balance of
maritime forces. The West's position of maritime superi-
ority could rapidly shift to one of maritime inferiority if
control of the landmass were to change, eg a Soviet military
presence in Iran cr a loss of Turkey to the West.
[Hef. 57].
E. PROTECTION OF SOVIET SLOCS
The Soviets also have interests in maintaining the
freedcm cf shipping in the Indian Ocean. This is one of the
reasons that they have supported the idea of the Indian
Ocean as a zcne of peace, an idea initially proposed by the
non-alignsd nations. Due to the great distances between
European Russia and the Far East, it is beneficial to the
Soviets to maintain facilities and support ships along the
route to support normal merchant shipping. [Hef. 58].
The Indian Ocean provides ready access to Southeast
Asian markets and raw materials. The Soviet Onion, like the
West, is faced with an increasing need for access to Middle
Eastern oil market and suppliers, as they are unable to
fully exploit their own. [ Ref . 59]. And, 45-50% of Soviet
military and economic aid goes to Indian Ocean littoral
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states, [Fef. 60]. Finally, in a subject tc be explored
more fully under the section on the People's Republic of
China (P5C) , one of the factors making the Indian Ocean
increasingly a flash point in great power maneuvering is the
importance of Soviet SLOCs to the Far East in case of a
Sino-Scviet war. [ Bef . 61]. With the severence of these
SLOCs, the Soviets fcculd be faced with a dependence on the
undependable Trans-Siberian railway and the ice-littered
northern route to support its Far Eastern forces and
interests.
C. NAVAL DIPLOMACY
The primary objective of both superpowers in the Indian
Ocean is to provide a political-military alternative to the
ether. Tc this end, the Soviets engage in naval diplomacy.
(Ref. 62].
1 . Soviet Pol icies an d , Aim s in t he Middle East
The four major thrusts of Soviet policy in the
broader Gulf area, in support of which the SNIOS (as well as
the military as a whele, and diplomacy) acts, are:
1. Discredit the role of the U.S. through propoganda and
diplomacy
,
2. Expand Soviet influence through the erection of a
chain of pro-Soviet strongholds,
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3. Support of revolutionary and subversive lovem.-a^o in
the area
,
4. Exploit the Islamic revolution in Iran. (Ref. 81].
Some see shrswd opportunism as the motive force
behind Scviet foreign policy. [Ref. 82]. Others believe
that Moscow's initiatives are more ad hoc in nature, rather
than supporting +-he grand plan theory of Soviet global
domination. [Ref. 83].
Geoffrey Jukes puts the Soviets' intentions in this
way. SNIOS operations, in support of Soviet policy, are
aimed at reducing Western influence along the entire Indian
Ocean littcral. A dominant influence in the area would help
in converting regional political systems into socialist
systems. The main Scviet interest in the Indian Ocean lies
not upon its sea lanes, but- on its shores. These interests
are to bolster non-aligned states, woo aligned states to
non-alignment, and to encourage newly independent states in
non-alignment. [Ref. 84]. So, a possible diplomatic
mission of the Sguadron is to offset any perceptions of
unilateral Western influence in the area.
The Soviets cite the presence of U.S. naval forces
and their movements as evidence of U.S. aggressive and
"hegemonic" designs in the area. Their counters to the 0.5.
naval presence have been condemnations of American moves for
"imperialistic control" of these strategic seas, and calls
for the establishment of "zones of peace" in the Indian
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Ocean and the Red Sea. They are concentrating on the ?DRY
in order to obtain naval base privileges at Aden, access to
facilities at Sccotra, and to upsat Oman, a friend of the
U.S. and the owner of the Musandara peninsula. Their basic
aim is to disrupt neutral or pro-western governments with
revolutionary movements in order to erode the Western power
base they perceive in the region.
Cne commonly held theory to explain the Soviets*
desire to gain control over some part of the Indian Ocean
littoral coastline is the desire, expressed by Peter the
Great, for "warm water ports." At that time, however,
Russia* s only coastline was on the Baltic, which was domi-
nated by Sweden and Poland, and on some northern ports,
which were icebound for about six months of the year. And,
ambition was never unlimited. At its highest, it aspired to
a stake in the Mediterranean, and, more realistically, to
control cf the entry to the Black Sea. [Ref. 85].
Another oft-cited story to explain the Soviets*
southward imperialist expansion is the Molotov-Ribbentrop
talks of 19U0. The real story behind this is that, to draw
Soviet attention away from their impending East European
invasion, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop proposed a
four-way entente that would eventually divide up the British
Empire. The proposed partition would have given each
country the British territories directly to their south.
The Soviets would receive the area in between Africa and the
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Pacific "in the general direction of the Indian Ocean." The
Soviets agreed en discussions, but no agreement was ever
made. Instead, Stalin pushed for clarification on Finland
and the Ealkans, brushing aside the Indian Ocean sphere as
relatively unimportant. [Ref. 86].
Providing military support for allies and friends
has always been an icporxant Soviet motivation in countries
such as Somalia. Among the Soviet motivations for
supporting Ethiopia in i+s war against Somalia in 1977 may
have been its interest in acquiring the right to base its
fleet at two Ethiopian ports on the Red Sea, Assab and
Massawa, as replacements for the excellent facility it lest
at Berbera, although support for Ethiopia is what cost them
access to Eerbera in the first place.
In recent years, the Soviet Union has acquired naval
facilities at Aden and is thought to have stockpiled
arms there. A twenty-year friendship treaty has beer-
signed, and several thousand Soviet, Cuban, and East
German military advisors are present. In 1977-78, over
$1 billion in arms, 17,000 Cuban troops, and 1,200
Soviet advisors were sea and airlifted to Ethiopia.
[Ref. 87].
Dismukes and McConnell view the Squadron's place in
Soviet policy in this way.
Moscow views the struggle as political in essence, but
taking numerous forms--ideological, economic, and diplo-
matic, with the diplomatic definitely comprehending the
military-diplomatic. In the Soviet view, the U.S. Navy
is their main obstacle in the Third World, the main
instrument of the U.S. Navy is the carrier task group,
and the main Soviet instrument to counter it is an anti-
carrier task group, the crucial unit of which is a
cruise-irissile submarine, supplemented by torpedo-attack
submarines. In the Indian Ocean, the impact has clearly
been mere politico-military and local than strategic, if
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only because (as the Soviets acknowledge themselves)
this body of water is not, and has not been, a Polaris
patrol area- [Ref. 88].
2 • N aval Diplomacy
Ever, though Atlantic and Indian Ocean deployments
(as measured in ship-days) have been consistently smaller
than those to the Mediterranean, the effort devcted to
diplomatic visits in these two regions has, just as consis-
tently, been proportionately higher. The relative intensity
of the Ir.dian Ocean effort is particularly striking, and
would appear to confirm the prominence of political concerns
in the Squadron* s mission structure.
Eespite the heavy emphasis on naval diplomacy by
both superpcwers, thcugh, "the super-power naval presence in
the Indian Ocean has -had no significant impact on events in
the Gulf." [Ref. 89 ].
Nonetheless, these individually capable ships provide an
important element cf Soviet presence in that area, and
could be used to limit the freedom of action of Western
forces during periods of crisis less than a major
conventional war between the superpowers. [Ref. 90].
Naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is attractive,
because it is a contest for influence where the rewards are
relatively great and the risks are relatively small. Making
well-timed appearances in Third World ports, or deplcyirg in
well-publicized opposition to the U.S. Navy, the Soviets can
claim to te protecting developing states from the forces of
imperialism. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet presence has
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raised the stakes in the game of naval diplomacy. It. the
1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Soviet task forces probably
couldn't have stopped the U.S. carrier task force from
making a military intervention, had that been their aim, but
it could have made it very costly, both militarily and
politically. The Soviets have taken a lesson from the
British, who showed that the best way to control the
littoral states was to control the sea lanes of the Indian
Ocean. Due to Soviet successes at naval diplomacy (or
Western failures), the U.S. may be seen as the "crippled
giant", likely to let local friends "go down the interna-
tional drain." [Ref. 91].
Kevin Jordan puts forth an interesting thesis to
explain why the relatively small SNIOS has been so influen-
tial. The basis of naval diplomacy is credibility; the
foundation of credibility is that vital interests are at
stake. Soviet vital interests are regional in scope and
limited in nature, covering primarily defensive alliances
with buffer states contiguous to the borders of the Soviet
Union. For effective naval diplomacy, the Soviets must
develcp significant economic and diplomatic associations in
regions beyond the areas contiguous to its borders. <This
follows the idea that narrow military powers as the main
instrument of foreign policy will surely fail in the long
run>. The Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf, as in the
Mediterranean, are peripheral. Even so, in the Indian Ocean
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it is the Soviet fl€€t which has the political advantage.
Comparative SNIOS weakness in relation to the the 0. S.
Indian Ocean presence is offset by the proximity of some 50
divisions near the Iranian- Afghan border. U.S. naval power
couldn*t presently prevent direct Soviet ground force inter-
vention. The Soviet capability to blitz the Persian Gulf
without defeat offsets the absence of a vital interest. The
secondary purpose of the SNIOS is to extend the political
power of the Soviet land forces massed in the vicinity of
the Iranian-Afghan bcrder. Naval power flexibility dimin-
ishes its pclitical potency with respect to ground forces,
because they are indicative of a lesser degree of decision;
because they can be recalled much easier. [Ref. 92].
According to Farer,
The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean conceiv-
ably may enhance the prospect for the overthrew of
existing governments on the Arab side of the Gulf;
Soviet ships might serve as a shield for radical insur-
gents or some newly installed radical regime threatened
with a seaborne intervention, mounted or organized by
the Rest in conjunction with regional allies.
This constitutes a modest Soviet tripwire, as in the
1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Some of the SNIOS' probable major
goals are:
1. Gaining political capital through showing the flag,
2. Maintaining a political tripwire,
3. Signalling the will and capacity to match any escala-
tion in Western activity. [Ref. 93].
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Coercive diplomacy involves a show of force to
encourage and show support for friendly governments, to sway
non-aligned governments, and to threaten unfriendly govern-
ments. Soviet ports in the region enhance, to a degree, the
image and reality of the Soviet Union as a great or global
power by symbolizing the Soviet presence, and by facili-
tating the protection of Soviet clients. Naval strength in
the Indian Ocean helps in this process, but it is not a
major part. "In tfce hierarchy of Soviet ranking termi-
nology, the Navy is consistently characterized as only an
•important' instrument of policy; it is not a 'most impor-
tant 1 , much less a 'main* instrument." [Ref. 94]. Some
courses cf possible Scviet naval action, within the limits
of their capabilities, are to exercise gunboat diplomacy
against the West and the PRC, to encourage and support
internal subversion, and tc actively suppcrt a client state
in a war with another Third World state <Ethiopia>.
[Ref. 96].
3 . Spe cif i c C ou ntry R e latio ns
The following are present or past formal Treaties of
Friendship between the USSR and seme Indian Ocean states:
1. Egypt: annulled by Egypt 15 March 1976,
2. Scmalia: 30 October 1974 - 1977,










India, Iraq, the PDBY, and other Indian Ocean spates
have so far apparently rebuffed Soviet efforts for permanent
base rights. Yet, Soviet-Cuban military success in Ethiopia
both warns Persian Gulf states and intimidates them. There
have beer seme reports of military assistance to Iran, and a
cutoff of military aid to Iraq by the Soviets. (Ref. 97].
Following their expulsion from Somalia in 1977, the
Squadron*s ships were staged in Aden. On 19 November, 1970,
the Indian Minister of External Affairs stated total opposi-
tion to the. establishment of naval bases in the Indian Ocean
by either the U.S., the O.K., or the IJ.S.S.R.
4 . Chr onol ogy and Spec ific Case s
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Navy was
doctrinally committed to defense of the Russian coastline,
or in direct support of ground forces operating on the
Eurasian land mass. The Soviet Navy began naval diplomacy
in the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Arab friends.
Operations in the Mediterranean were soon extended to the
Indian Ocean and the Atlantic littoral of Africa.
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In the early 1960s, Sevier crews flew Egyptian TU-16
bombers against Royalist forces in North Yemen, but the real
start cf Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean began
in 1968. The opening diplomatic gambit in 1968 was a good-
will visit to India by the Commander of the Soviet Facific
Fleet. Two of the three ships under his command also
visited Somalia, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf.
The new Squadron made a port visit to Somalia in
December, 1969 to show its support for the new regime of
Siad Barre. In April of 1970, it again made a port visit to
Somalia amid rumors of a possible coup attempt against
President Barre by the Ethiopians. There is little evidence
that either visit actually helped prop up the Barre regime,
but it was indicative of the Soviets* willingness to use a
show of force to support its friends in the Third World.
Late in 1970, the Russians landed a survey team on the
island of Sccotra, where they were reportedly building a
naval communications station and other facilities.
[Ref. 98]. A U.S. Congressional delegation could not
confirm this, however, when they visited the Island in that
year.
Cn 15 January, 1971, during a Commonwealth Heads of
Government conference in Singapore, two Soviet warships
passed by in full sight, lending support to British Prime
Minister Heath's argument of a Red menace. Two Soviet auxi-
liaries repeated the passage the next day, loitering
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offshcre for a couple of hours. Som9 possible reasons for
these cccurrances are:
1. Oversight or accident on the part of the Soviets,
thcugh that dcesn*t explain the loitering offshore by
the auxiliaries,
2. To cause a disruption in the proceedings, provoking
Heath, but not the African leaders,
3. It was Heath who planned it to giva emphasis to his
speech, though this still doesn't explain the actions
of the auxiliaries,
4. A combination cf the first three.
After the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War broke out, the
naval contingents in the Indian Ocean built up to record
levels. The U.S. had 14 conbatants and auxiliaries, the
Soviets had 26, and the British had 21, though the British
were in the Indian Ocean, not in response to the crisis, but
to assist in their withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. The
normal Soviet relief force entered the Indian Ocean in
December and the decision was made to maintain both forces
on station, effectively carrying out a reinforcement.
The following is a chronology of the important naval
events of the war:
1. 12/3: West Pakistan conducts an air strike against
India, and India invades in the East,





3. 12/6-7:First Soviet task force leaves Vladivostok
(Kynda, Julett, and Foxtrot)
,
4. 12/9: Firs- Soviet TF, with a Kynda CG and an SSM
submarine, sighted in Tsushima Strait,
5. 12/10: U.S. TF 74 forms with Enterprise and Tripoli,
and moves to a holding area east of Singapore,
6. 12/12: Dacca is evacuated of all foreign personnel,
and the British TF, standing by, withdraws,
7. 12/13: Second Soviet TF leaves for the Indian Ocsan
(Kresta-II, 2cho-II, and 2 Foxtrot)
,
8. 12/14: TF 74 enters Malacca,
The Soviets end surveillance of British TF,
which exits the Indian Ocean,
' 9. 12/15: TF 74 enters the Bay of Bengal,
10- 12/16: West Pakistan surrenders in Dacca,
TF 74 diverts to southwest of Sri Lanka,
11. 12/17: Armistice signed,
12. 12/18: TF 74 picks up its first tattletail,
Second Soviet TF transits Malacca.
Each Soviet task force was configured for anticar-
rier warfare, consisting of 12 SSM launchers and 6 SAM rails
per task force. It is fairly clear that the first Soviet
task force was meant to counter the British carrier, and
that the second was a counter to the Enterprise task force.
It would seem that both naval forces accomplished what they
set out to do. The U.S. forces set the political stage
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which deterred the Indians from invading into West Pakistan,
and the Soviet forces raised the stakes enough that the O.S.
forces were deterred from intervening on behalf of the
Pakistanis. It is urimportant whether the U.S. intended to
intervene or not (it is doubtful, considering the location
of the bulk of the Indian forces in the north, around
Kashmir). What is important is that the Soviets reacted
forthrightly, and could claim to the world that they had
faced down the "imperialists."
Following the 1971 War, the Soviets offered to clear
the Bengali harbors cf Chittagong and Chalna of mines and
wreckage. For the Chittagong mined earing operations, the
Soviets premised a six week completion time, but it took one
and one-half years. They then reneged en their premise to
clear Chalna. The Soviet commander, Admiral Zuyenko,
dragged his heels, partly to use the Soviet Navy to build
Soviet influence in Bangladesh. They were embarasssd,
however, when a O.N. team cleared Chalna in under five
months. In this operation, the Soviet Onion conducted its
first ever case of gunboat diplomacy other than the tradi-
tional diplomatic port visit. They completed the
minesweeping phase in Chittagong, but only after the Indian
Navy had already completed a substantial portion. The




Then, in March of 1973, the Soviets supported the
Iraqis when they invaded portions of Kuwait, with a naval
port visit, accompanied by Admiral Gorshkcv. In the summer
cf 1973, the SNIOS effected the transfer and support of up
to 200 Yemeni troops from Aden to the eastern provinces,
possitly to take part in the Dhofari rebellion against the
Sultan of Oman.
Curing the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Indian
Ocean contingents were again reinforced. The U.S. sent the
Hancock carrier task force to protect the shipping lanes,
while the Soviets sent what amounted to a token force,
including a Sverdlov cruiser, and an Echo-II and 2 Fcxtrot
submarines. Part of the reason for the Soviet buildup may
have teen in support of President Breshnev's visit to India
at the same time. What was impressive about the Soviets'
handling cf this crisis was that, at the same time as they
were responding to the U.S. moves in the Indian Ocean, they
were simultaneously covering three U.S. carrier task forces
and one amphibious task force in the Mediterranean with 4
separate anticarrier task forces. In addition, for the
first time they took part in operations ashore. The Navy
assisted in a major resupply effort, helped evacuate Soviet
citizens frcm Arab countries, collected intelligence inside
the war zone, and lent credibility to Soviet threats of
intervention with airborne troops. What is important to
note is the comprehensiveness with which they were able to
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act on multiple fronts, and against many tsrg<=ts
simultaneously.
An even larger minesweeping force than was used in
Bangladesh in 1971 was used to conduct clearing operations
in the Strait of Gubal, south of the Suez Canal in 1974. A"1-
first, asked for assistance by the Egyptians, the Soviets
had set forth a list cf conditions for their help. When the
U.S. commenced a major effort to clear the Canal, however,
the Soviets offered to sweep the Strait for free. The heli-
copter cruiser Leningrad took part in this operation,
conducting helicopter mine hunting operations in order to
counter the publicity the Americans were getting for
conducting similar operations. So important was the venture
to the Soviets that both Admiral Gorshkov and Marshal
Grechko attended Leningrad's pre-sailing ceremony at
Sevastopol. Between 1972 and 1974, these minesweeping oper-
ations accounted for as much as one-third of the total
number of ship-days accumulated by the Soviet Navy in the
Indian Ocean. [Ref. 99],
Euring the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia,
the SNIOS had the following missions:
1. Sea control in the southern Red Sea and the western
Gulf of Oman,
2. Protect shipping to Ethiopia,





u. Protect Soviet personnel,
5. Conduct reconnaissance,
6. Conduct shore bombardment operations.
In July 1S78, intelligence analysts said that Soviet access
to Ethiopian facilities should eventually more than compen-
sate fcr the loss of those in Somalia. [fief. 100].
In March 1979, the Minsk battle group rounded the
Cape of Good Hope, called at Mauritius, and operated off
Sccotra, supported by Soviet land-based aircraft cut of The
PDRY. The battle group eventually continued on to the
Pacific, continuing a trend in transfers to the Pacific
Fleet frcm the Northern Fleet, making port visits in route.
D. SPACE PHCGBAH
The polar prcjectcry of the Soviet space program passes
over the Indian Ocean from Madagascar to the Arabian Sea.
The Soviets often deploy Space Event Support Ships (SESS) to
the area for the purposes of tracking and recovering satel-
lite capsules. [Ref. 101].
E. E0BEA0CBATIC LEVERAGE
In the Soviet Onion, the Navy is of secondary importance
to the Army, which makes it more difficult to obtain funding
in a world of limited resources. In this respect, if
Admiral Gorshkov can convince the military establishment
46

that an Indian Ocean presence is necessary, he would bo able
to extract more funding with which to build up the Navy in
general. [Ref. 102].
F. PISHING FLEET
The Soviet Union depends heavily upon its fishing fleet
to supply the protein, needed by the population, that poor
harvests denies. A significant percentage of this comes
from the Indian Ocean, specifically from off the eastern
coast of South Africa and Madagascar. To support the
required fishing fleet, the Soviets have concluded a treaty
with the government of Mauritius, whereby they can fly in
relief crews for the ships. They also maintain anchorages
off Durban South Africa and the coast of Madagascar, and
have anchcred tankers in the Mozambique Channel. In recent
years, the Indian Ocean provided them with a fifth or mere
of their catch. [Ref. 103].
With the rise in unilateral coastal-state claims to
living resources, the occasiens requiring naval escorts for
fishing fleets have grown exponentially. They haven't sent
Soviet naval ships tc protect their fishing fleet off South
America, possibly due to 0. S. sensitivity; a lack of secure,
friendly port facilities; or fear of an actual confrontation
with Latin navies, with its attendent costs. [Ref. 104].
These conditions have not been as prevalent in the Indian
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Ocean fishir.g grounds to date. Therefore, increased naval
protection of fishing fleet assets, to the degree necessary,
can te assumed.
G. SEIZURE OF TERRITORY
According to N.P. V*iunenko, there are two main types of
amphibious operations. The first is the seizure of ports
and naval bases in enemy territory for Soviet naval usage or
for denial tc the enemy. The second is to overcome resis-
tance at "broad water barriers, particularly estuaries,
sounds, and channels" to maintain a high rate of ground
advance. [Ref. 105].
A look at the southern border of the U.S.S.R. in the
Trans-Caucasus area reveals what drives the historical
Russian desire to gain direct access to the Indian
Ocean, which no doubt contributed to the Soviet decision
to invade Afghanistan in late 1979. [Ref. 106].
It must be presumed that the Director is indicating the
factor of proximity to the so-called warm-water ports
refuted by Jukes in the section on naval diplomacy.
A more likely prospect <than invasion of Iran,
Pakistar, or a peninsular state> is the lightening
employment of limited Soviet military force to assist
local pro-Soviet forces in seizing power, or to, preempt
0..S. fo rce s in a crisi s area. (emphasis mine)
[Ref. 107].
Admiral William Crowe speaks of a possible move by
the Soviets towards the Persian Gulf in this way:
Repeatedly during the nineteenth century, Czarist Russia
sought to bring Iran within its sphere of influence in
order tc gain a warm water outlet to the Arabian Sea and
shorten the lines of communication to its empire in the
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Far East. <Actually, the Russians worked mors with the
Persians, vs the Ottomans, rather than against them>.
In short, Soviet control of the Persian Gulf oil fields
would give the Russians enormous power in the world
economy, and enable -hem tc meet their own energy
requirements far mere efficiently than they can from the
Far East. The Soviets continue to look at the world in
terms of political situations that are •ripe 1 for
intervention; the Persian Gulf's dynamic situation may
very well offer them such an opportunity.
The Soviet Army has 160 divisions, 6 in Central Asia, and 2U
in the southern USSR. The southern and central ground
forces are at 1/3 strength, but car. be reinforced rapidly
and flexibly due to excellent infrastructure from European
Russia to the Baku region. They have a military air trans-
port force of over 1,500 fixed wing aircraft and 3,660
helicopters. Reverses in Somalia and Egypt could cause them
to shift attention away from the Suez-Red Sea route toward
the traditional objective of a direct outlet on the Persian
Gulf.
Without immediate and successful intervention by Western
naval and air forces, the Soviets would be in an excel-
lent position to overcome the Iranian air force,
introduce airborne infantry units, and extend the reach
of mechanized units onto the shores of the Gulf.
Or, they could occupy northwestern Iran, and join with the
Iraqis in order to seize Kuwait. Or, "--a strong military
foothold en the Horn of Africa would place the Soviets and
Iraqis in an ideal position to exert pressure on Saudi
Arabia." The Preponderance of soviet power to the north
could present the West with a fait accompli. Soviet air and
ground forces in the southern Soviet Union are outside the
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scope of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace talks, yet give them
an advantage in rapid power projection to the Gulf. The
Soviets don't see the possible agreement as limiting their
own projection of power to the Indian Ocean littoral,
especially the Horn cf Africa. Yet, U.S. options for
resupply/reinf orcement of the Persian Gulf assume that, in
times cf crisis, the O.S. will establish and maintain naval
superiority in the Western Indian Ocean." [Ref. 108]. Our
problem in the Persian Gulf is to stop their fait accompli
prior tc our arrival, as they can use strong proximate
forces and client local forces. [Ref. 109].
Even if the O.S. 1 alternative energy programs were
successful, the impact of leaving the Gulf would alter the
world balance of power in favor of the Soviets, as the Gulf
states became subject to the dictates of Moscow's military
power. Soviet econcmic gains through even partial control
of Gulf oil would guickly translate to greater military
spending and ability to manipulate the policies of energy-
dependent Third World countries, to say nothing of Western
Europe. With Gulf oil no longer an asset available to NATO,
the alliance itself would forfeit the ability to fight a
sustained conventional war and, in effect, dissolve as a
credible factor in wcrid affairs." [Ref. 110].
Citing Tsar Peter's Imperial testament, and the
Stalin-Hitler Pact, the Soviets ma^ have an imperial aim
toward reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
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[Ref. 111]- Since Czarist times, the rulers of Russia have
probed southward, seeking access to the southern sea lanes
that are new major cil routes and thus a lifeline of the
industrialized world. Instead of seeking only warm water
ports, the Soviets are attempting to control access tc the
oil riches of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
[Ref. 113]- Stalin felt the area was important enough tc
include in his 1939 pact with Hitler, which recognized the
area south cf Batum and Baku in the general direction of the
Persian Gulf as the center of aspirations of the Soviet
Union.
H. iARFlGHTING
This section is pretty much a catch-all. Some ideas
seem to defy categorization as any of the above theories.
Therefore, the definition here of warfighting is an active
mission which deals loosely with conflict situations and
doesn't closely fit into any of the above theories.
According to Nitze and Sullivan, the implications of the
Soviet Union's landlocked geography for its navy are that it
must keep its ships close to home, support them with auxili-
aries over long distances, rely on foreign bases, or
consider them expendable in times of conflict. It follows
from this that the Soviet Navy should be reluctant tc commit
major elements of its fleet to remote areas during a crisis.
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Although Soviet naval fleet support is weak, the Soviet
merchant marine, whose ships ply all the seas, also
furnishes supplies, including fuel, to -he navy. In the
event that hostilities seemed probable, Soviet naval units
could be sent out from the confines of coastal waters, to
escape throughthe chcke points before the war began. In the
event of war with the West, they would like to seize the oil
fields ard interdict seaborne support and reinforcements to
the area. Their naval potential is for oil SLOC interdic-
tion, anti-CVBG warfare, and as an anti-Diego Garcia force.
This is risky, though, especially against Diego Garcia,
without air cover. If nothing else, it could draw off a lot
of D.S. naval forces, which could be better used elsewhere.
Finally, they could interpose themselves between U.S. naval
forces ard an arsa of crisis, blocking an intended interven-
tion. The Indian Ccean is a source of excellent naval
access to the South Atlantic, and the Pacific Oceans. Oil
is not the only SLOC cf potential interest. The West might
need a SLOC to support a large task force or other military
operations along the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf,
Arabian Sea, or Sea cf Aden. These SLOCs would be "long,
exposed, and lacking in receptive way-stations."
[Ref. 114]. Aircraft launched missiles, launched from the
Turkmen SSR (460 miles from the Persian Gulf) or Afghanistan
(300 miles from the Gulf of Oman) , are a serious threat to
U.S. naval forces there. [Ref. 115].
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Direct Soviet naval actions are presently precluded by:
detente, the strength (or lack of iz) of deployed forces,
their ccmparati vely meager infrastructure, a lack of air
support, an inability to augment their forces after the war
starts, and the ability of the West to hold hostage their
fishing and merchant marine fleets. One thing they can do,
though, is to gain expertise in tropical operations and the
logistics associated with long-range naval operations.
[Hef. 116].
The Scviet Navy has a greater need for, but less assured
access to littoral support facilities. Their ships have
less per unit endurance and less habi-ability space than
U.S. ships. They are one-shot SSM ships, generally. They
have inferior amphibious support capabilities, and a more
limited underway replenishment capability. One major
missicn fcr the SNICS today is to gain operational experi-
ence in the region. [Ref. 117]. Yet, they are becoming
less dependent on shore bases with the development of
increased replenishment at sea capabilities. [Ref. 118].
The transfer of ships to the Pacific Fleet, from which
deployments to the Indian Ocean would be made, effectively
removed them from participation in crises in the Atlantic
Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea. In short, the Soviets
consciously fragmented their naval power in order tc conduct
operations in the Indian Ocean. The Squadron conducts three
primary surveillance patrols: one in the Bab el Mandeb
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Strait, one in the Strait of Hormuz, and one near the U.S.
base en Diego Garcia. [ Ref . 119].
I. S0MM1BY
1 . Disruption of Weste rn SL OCs
Cf all the theories listed in this chapter, it
appears that the disruption cf Western SLOCs is the one that
generates the greatest amount of debate. It is also the one
cited most often by authors that put the Squadrcn in an
aggressive light, and that are sounding the call to arms in
order to meet a growing menace. Those who dispute this
theory, en the other hand, tend to view the Sguadronas
natural instrument of policy by a superpower, and that there
is little tc be alarmed about, short of a general East-West
war, in the Indian Ocean.
It appears that those who argue against a disruption
mission have a stronger argument. There is little doubt
that a Soviet man-of-war, upon sighting a U.S. -flag or
allied merchantman during a time of open hostilities, would
interdict it, as leng as it didn't interfere with another
more vital irission. They would not, however, perform such a
mission in peacetime, and would be unlikely to dedicate
units to it during wartime. During peacetime, such an
action would precipitate open hostilities, something which
the Soviets have historically been extremely hesitant tc do.
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In the context of a hct war, or in the planning to
start one, it is again unlikely that the Soviets would dedi-
cate units -o interdiction of merchant shipping. The main
naval fear cf the Soviets is that ofU.S. carriers or SSENs
striking the Soviet homeland. For them tc put units in the
Indian Ocean to defend against that is net an unreasonable
expectation, but that is a different mission. For them to
put units into the Indian Ocean to interdict merchant
traffic while the carriers and SSBNs could strike at them
from ether oceans is unreasonable -co expect. The main naval
wars will be in the Ncrth Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and
the West Pacific. Until those are resolved in the Soviets*
favor, if ever, merchant interdiction will not be pursued by
them in any ocean, including the Indian Ocean. When they do
decide tc interdict, they are more likely tc do so closer to
the end cf the sea lanes, rather than at the beginning.
This allows them the greater mission flexibility, since the
Indian Ocean is logistically distant from the Soviet Onion.
The Soviet military in general seems to plan predom-
inantly en a short war scenario. Their problems in
Afghanistan, however, may cause them to rethink this. They
do not expect to be pushed back, or to be stopped in their
attack. In a short war scenario, the disruption cf SLOCs is
of a lesser importance. In this scenario, assuming a Soviet
victory for the moment, they could easily interdict at will
following the conflict. During the conflict, the mission of
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the Soviet Navy is to destroy the projection power of the
U.S. Navy. Insofar as they could do that and interdict the
merchant traffic, they would do so. But their forces in the
Indian Ocean are vulnerable, with very limited air support.
Admiral Wegener's discussion of strategic positions vice
maritime positions is indicative of this. This condition
will remain until the Soviets control the Suez Canal, the
Turkish straits, and the Mediterranean. Once this is done,
interdiction will be easily accomplished, but it also would
likely be indicative of a Soviet victory overall. To
restate the conclusion then, the Soviets are vary unlikely
to disrupt Western SIOCs during peacetime, and will net be
very inclined or able during open conflict, short of having
achieved a general victory elsewhere.
2. Frc tec ticn_of .Soviet SIOCs
The section en the protection of Soviet SLOCs is
much shorter than the one on disruption of Western SIOCs.
The main reasons that it is not cited often by the authors
is that it does not directly affect U.S. vital interests in
the area (in fact, it is a vital Soviet interest) , and that
there is little argument against the idea that it is a
mission of the Squadron. None argue the fact that the
northern sea route and the Trans-Siberian railway are unde-
pendable, due either to weather or to possible Chinese
interdiction. None argue the large amount of Soviet ship-
ping that plies the Indian Ocean sea lanes in support of the
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Soviet Far East, or in trade with its allies in southern and
Southeast Asia.
The only question is the priority of the mission.
It is difficult to imagine it to be of low priority. The
size and makeup of the normal Squadron 2 are such that it is
not unreasonable to think that protection of Soviet sea
lanes is cne of the Squadron's main missions. In fact, as
shall be seen mere fully in chapter V, the Soviets them-
selves are quick to point out just how important the Indian
Ocean sea lanes are tc them. This is sufficient reason to
station a squadron in the Indian Ocean.
3 • Naval Diplomacy
There is no argument about the diplomatic mission of
the Squadron. Much of the discussion revolves around wha't
the policy of the Soviet Union is, which the Squadron
supports. In a bipolar, zero-sum mode, this can be seen as
being hostile and a threat to O.S. interests. In a multi-
polar, non-zero-sum mode, it is the natural and expected
action of a great power. The Squadron's naval diplomacy
mission was best summed up by Farer when he described its
goals as:
1. Saining political capital through showing the flag,
2. Maintaining a political tripwire, and
2 This is discussed fully in chapter II,
57

3. Signalling the will and capacity of the Soviet Union
tc match any escalation in Western activity.
The writings of the ether authors say the same thing, in
essence.
4 . Spa ce P rogram and B ureaucrat i c Lev erage
There is no argument that one of the missions of the
Squadron is to support the Soviet space program. They
normally maintain a space event support ship on station, and
they often make pickups of satellite capsules, as well as
tracking orbiting platforms. One added function is that
these ships can also do double duty in surveillance of
Western Indian Ocean activities.
The bureaucratic leverage theory was very inter-
esting, but net very convincing. The Soviet generals are
intelligent enough tc see through a smoke screer that has no
substance. If there is substance there, then they are
reacting to that substance, and not the smokescreen. The
section on the space program was very short, because it is
generally accepted and not vital to either the West or the
Soviets; while the section on bureaucratic leverage is very
short, because it was cited by only one author in any
capacity, and appears to have little substance or impor-
tance. Even if it was true, it would make little difference
to the Western planner, who must react to the very real
presence it would lead to, rather than the unapparent work-
ings of the Kremlin.
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5. Fishin g Fleet
There is nc argument that the protection cf the
fishing fleet is a mission of the Squadron. There is also
no argument that the Squadron has not seen a need to carry
it out. It occasionally acts in support of the fishing
fleet, but the Sguadron»s units are normally located in the
northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, while the fishing
fleet is located in the southwest quadrant, along the
Mozambique Channel, and east of Madagascar.
6 . Seizure of Territory
This mission, in the Indian Ocean, would be executed
in the context of a Soviet land operation in a southward
direction from the Soviet Onion toward the Indian Ocean or
Persian Gulf waters. This operation could be focused
anywhere frcm Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. Yet, it is gener-
ally recognized that a Soviet invasion from the Caucasus or
Soviet Central Asia is the least likey form of a threat to
O.S. interests in the Middle East.
It is generally accepted that, in the Soviet Union,
the Navy is the junicr service to the Army. Because of that
relationship, one of its major missions overall, in addition
to affecting a strategic defense of the Soviet homeland, is
to act in direct support of Soviet ground operations. With
this in mind, it is apparent that, in the context of a
Soviet land operation in the Middle Easx, the Squadron would
act in support. The Squadron has a small amphibious
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capability which could be used to seize and hold strategic
choke pcirts until a larger, more permanent force could
arrive. This is of a very limited nature, though. The
amphibious lift capability numbers up re two LSTs, carrying
some 400 Marines. In most cases, more could be done with
the Soviets* impressive airborne troop capability.
This mission, then, deals with a least-likely scen-
ario. The Squadron's capabilities in its regard are of a
very limited nature, and the job could be done better by
ether forces. Seizure operations within the scope of the
Squadron's forces are more likely to be classified under
naval diplomacy. Their operations in support of the Dhofari
rebels in Oman are indicative of this, although they did not
involve the actual seizure of territory.
7 • Warfighting
In a hot war scenario, the Squadron's missions are
likely tc be:
1. Interdiction of Western reaction forces,
2. Act in ar economy of force role, to diffuse the
Western naval effort,
3. Tc destroy Western naval forces,
4. To control cheke points.
These missions are of a tactical nature, and may
shift according to the nature and course of the conflict.
The discussion from here is not of a mission nature, but of




I?. O.S. THEORIES: REACTIVE MISSIONS
A. AHTI-SSEN
This theory states that the Squadron was initially in
response to a possible strategic threat emanating from -he
Arabian Sea and the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean.
[Ref. 120]. It is one of the most popular theories to
explain the Squadron's presence, at least in its early
years. According tc the theory, a Polaris submarine with
the 2,500 NM (stated range) A3 missile could perform its
most efficient targeting from the above listed areas, as
well as from the Gulf of Guinea on sub-Saharan Africa*s
Western coast. From the Arabian Sea, the Polaris-launched
A3 could simultaneously cover targets 3 in the European and
Asian Soviet Union, and in the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) . According tc Soviet writers Marshal Sckolcvskii and
Cherednichenko, "The first priority mission of naval opera-
tions in the oceanic and sea theatres will be the
destruction of atoiric missile submarines." [Ref. 125].
Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet naval chief, said
We also cannot remain indifferent to the expansion of
the basing of O.S. nuclear-powered submarines and
carrier forces ... in the Indian Ocean, and in other




areas of the world ocean, for all of this powerful and
widely dispersed military organization is directed
against the USSR and the countries of the
socialist community. [Ref. 126].
In 1S63, the United States concluded an agreement with
Australia to build a VLF communications station en their
Northwest Cape. The Soviets must certainly have seen this
as a preparation for conducting submarine operations ir. the
Indian Ocean, particularly because VLF is primarily used for
communications with patrolling submarines. A look at the
map of the Indian Ocean shows the Northwest Cape to resemble
an arrow pointed in the direction of the Arabian Sea. The
question arises that r if the U.S. did not plan to operate
SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, why build the Northwest Cape
communications station at all? In 1964, the Soviets, in an
apparent attempt to use diplomacy to protect them from the
strategic threat emanating from the Indian Ocean, made a
proposal to the United Nations that the Indian Ocean be made
a nuclear-free zone. Then, in 1966, the British and the
Americans signed an agreement whereby the O.S. would build a
naval base en the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos
Archipelagc, approximately 2,000 NM from the Gulf of Hormuz.
Due to these events, the Soviets were forced to implement a




Seme authors minimize the importance of the ar.ti-SSBN
role cf the Squadron. [ Bef . 127]. They point out the
distance that must be traveled from Rota, Holy Lech, and
Guam tc arrive on station in the Arabian Sea (and new, Rota
is no longer used as an SSBN base, increasing the total
distances that must be travelled) . For a 60 day patrol, the
transit time would be prohibitive to the most efficient
operation cf the size-limited Polaris fleet. Then too,
there is no evidence that the U.S. Navy has used the Arabian
Sea as an SSBN patrolling area. This is a fact that
even the Soviets appear to recognize. [Bef. 128].
The idea that the the Trident SSBN would be more useful
than the Pclaris in the Arabian Sea does not stand up to
scrutiny. The Trident is available in even more limited
numbers than is the Polaris/Poseidon fleet, and is home-
ported in the continental U.S. It is therefore cf even less
efficient use in the Arabian Sea due to the reasons cited
above. And the Trident missile (as well as the future C-5
missile) allows the submarine to operate closer to
U.S
.
/Western-controlled air and sea space, which makes more
useful such ideas as SSBN bastions. With these capabili-
ties, it seems unlikely that the Trident would be sent half
way around the world tc do something that it could do just
as well in friendlier, sheltered waters. And, the value
of SSBNs stationed in the Indian Ocean is limited by the




A final reason that the U.S. Navy is unlikely to use the
Arabian Sea as an SSBN operating area is the fear of
offending the ?RC. This is a thought that has not received
much press, but which should be seriously considered. In
February, 1972, President Nixon visited Peking, opening up
the read to normalized relations between the U.S. and the
PRC. This normalization has progressed, tc date, tc the
point that the U.S. sees the PRC as an ally in containing
Soviet expansionism. One cf the reasons given by the
Polaris thecry fcr Arabian Sea SSBN patrols is that a subma-
rine in the Arabian Sea could simultaneously cover targets
in bcth the Soviet Union and the PRC. In light of the
greatly improved relations between the U.S. and the PPC in
the last cecade, it is unlikely that the U.S. would tak€ the
chance of offending the Chinese by posing a threat to them
from the Indian Ocean.
As the Sino-Soviet breach grew, the Soviets couldn't
understand why the U.S. didn't decrease its Polaris forces
in the Pacific. They felt that B-52s would be sufficient
against inadequate Chinese air defenses. Since the U.S.
didn't decrease its Polaris forces, then, they must ail be
targeted at the Soviet Union. There weren't enough Soviet
Far Eastern targets to account for all the Polaris forces,
therefore, there must be plans to send some of them into the
Arabian Sea, where they could reach new targets. Add this
to the U.S.' prioritization of the Pacific forces for the
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receipt of the new A-3 missile, and the 1963 announcement of
the new VLF station en the Northwest Cape of Australia, and
there appears to be a reasonable justification for the
Soviets tc anticipate such U.S. SSBN deployments to the
Indian Ocean.
The first A-3 deployment took place in September, 1964.
This led to the Soviets 1 7 December 1964 memorandum tc the
U.N. titled, "On Measures for Further Easing International
Tension and Restricting the Arms Race." This memorandum
proposed that the Indian Ocean be a nuclear-free zone.
Hints of a link between this and A-3 are:
1. The only two seas mentioned as nuclear-free zones
were the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean,
2. Passage would hurt U.S. targeting opportunity, but
would little effect those of the USSR, especially
with respect tc the Indian Ocean,
3. The memorandum was presented to the U.N. less than
eight weeks after the ouster of Khrushchev, pointing
to its origin under his leadership,
4. The mention cf only the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean makes clear the Soviet belief in the possi-
bility of successful negotiations on those areas.
[Hef. 130].
Improved SSBN and carrier-based threats were a great
impetus for the Soviet Navy*s extending to forward deploy-
ment in crder to fight, starting in the Mediterranean. The
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same reasons that pushed them into the Mediterranean also
pushed them into the Indian Ocean, except that:
1. The Indian Ocean SS BN threat was a potential one,
while the threat from the Mediterranean was current,
2. They had no friends in the Indian Ocean with already
developed naval bases,
3. That made per-ship deployment mere expensive in a
time of tightening finances,
4. The Elack Sea Fleet was already fully extended with
its Mediterranean requirement,
5. The A-3 missile of th e tiae only had one warhead,
fully occupying them with Far East targer.s,
6. The Indian Ocean threat at the time was only from
SSENs, the detection of which would take a great deal
of resources, for a threat which was only a potential
one,
7. There was a desire to not change the Britain's mind
on withdrawing from east of the Suez, or to push the
U.S. to replace them, or to push the British into
buying its fifth Polaris submarine. [Ref. 131].
Yet still, operating experience would be nice to have in
case the potential threat eventually did show up. In 1968,
the fears cf littoral states about the U.S., due to the
Vietnam War, were goir.g up; the A-3 missile began to receive
nultiple warheads, which raised the stakes and potentially
freed some Pacific Polaris submarines for operating in the
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Indian Ocean; the Eritish announced their impending with-
drawal frcm the Indian Ocean region; and the new government
cf Aden proved to be not unfriendly to the Soviets. The
Polaris threat created the necessity for the Soviet deploy-
ments, while the rest provided the opportunity. [Ref. 132].
The introduction of the first of the new Trident
nuclear-missile submarines into the U.S. Pacific
Command, covering the Indian Ocean as well as the
Pacific, this year < 1 980>--probably in
September—under scores American strategic interest in
the waters betweer Indonesia and the east coast of
Africa. [Ref. 133].
This will probably intensify the Soviet naval presence
in the Indian Ocean. Some analysts believe that O.S SLBM
submarines operate in the Indian Ocean on a routine basis,
although this is disputed. The Ombai-Wetar and
Makasar-Lcmbok Straits are deep enough for safe, unimpeded
underwater transit. In 1976, the Indonesian Foreign
Minister confirmed that his government was engaged in nego-
tiations with both the Soviets and the Americans over
safeguards concerning underwater movements of nuclear subma-
rines using the Indonesian straits. In February 1976, in a
spy scandal in Indonesia, an officer in Indonesia's hydro-
graphic office was convicted of passing charts and documents
about the Indonesian straits to the Soviets, which could be
used to counter O.S. ASW measures. It is believed some of
the SLBM-armed O.S. submarines to be targeted against the




The Soviet shift to forward deployment came in two
phases. The first lasted through 1967, and culminated with
a Soviet presence in the Mediterranean after gaining access
to Egyptian ports and airfields after the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War. The second phase of the shift began in 1967, and
addressed the threat of the A-3 Polaris missile.
Long-standing Soviet suspicions about the Arabian Sea as a
patrol area for O.S. SLBM submarines were fueled by the 1963
VLF agreement for North West Cape in Australia, and by the
British-Airerican agreement on the use of Diego Garcia.
[Ref. 135].
Pclaris deployments could take place to -he Indian
Ocean, but would ccst much more than they would achieve.
Nevertheless, the Scviets must treat it as an option they
must be able to counter. The SNIOS maintains a constant ASW
capability, but it is not predominant. From 1974-1975,
under 20$ of SNIOS ships in any given month had an ASW capa-
bility. [Ref. 136]. As long as Trident ma^ deploy to the
Indian Ocean, the Scviets must maintain an ASW capability
there. [Ref. 137].
Crew endurance and reenlistment rates set limits on the
cruising range. It would also take more submarines to
ensure one was ready and on station at all times. Yet,
"Despite efforts to discount it, the ASW hypothesis retains
a plausible role in any comprehensive explanation of Soviet
interests." [Ref. 138]. They may :
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1. Net appreciate fully the ways the U.S. determines
cost-ef fect iveness,
2. Be planning fcr the technical worst-case scenario, as
we tend tc do, or
3. Be laying the foundation for an unpredictable future.
[Ref. 139].
After all, detente could break down, ABM restraints
could fall away, or there could be a breakthrough in ASW,
making it useful or necessary to expand SL3M patrol areas.
The U.S. might decide to shrug off the political costs of a
submarine base in Scuth Africa. In addition, it takes a
great deal cf time, effort, and expense tc establish the
political relationships, physical infrastructure, and the
experience necessary to operate effectively in a new
environment.
Whether or not it influenced the initial decision to
deploy east of Suez, development of an antisubmarine
capability now appears to be a significant part of the
Russian mission there. During the worldwide naval exer-
cise called OKEAN, conducted by the Russians in 1975,
this seems to have been the only function assigned to
their Indian Ocean sguadron. [Ref. 140].
B. PCST-D.K. ?ACOUM
This theory states that the Soviets were "drawn" into
the Indian Ocean by the political and military vacuum
produced when the British withdrew from "east of the Suez".
[Ref. 141]. It is not a coincidence that the Soviets moved
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naval forces into the Indian Ocean in 1963 following the
coming to Fewer of a Marxist-oriented regime in Ader. in
1967, and the decisicn by the British to withdraw from east
of the Suez in 1968 after lengthy debate in Parliament. The
Soviet Union has made no secret of its security interests in
the Middle East, alcng its southern borders. (Ref. 143].
The new regime in Aden made it possible for Soviet naval
units tc have access to local facilities, although the
Yemenis have consistently refused a formal access treaty.
The British withdrawal then provided the necessary rcom for
the Soviets to conduct their naval diplomacy. An additional
incentive for the Soviets to expand naval forces into the
Indian Ocean was the relative level of success met during
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which, for the first time,
they were able to operate on an even basis in opposition to
the U.S. Navy.
The pattern of Scviet initiatives shows them pursuing a
pattern of trying tc replace the British as controllers of
the strategic straits. A Soviet naval squadron entered the
Indian Ccean from Vladivostok only two months after the
British announced their decision to withdraw. [Ref. 144].
They stayed for four months.
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C. THE CHINESE THREAT
The Sine-Soviet split began to take form about 1961 , and
became official by 1963. Good relations between China and
Pakistan, and between China and various groups in Southeast
Asia, began to worry the Soviets. They feared that
increased Chinese influence in southern Asia might threaten
their Indian Ocean SLCCs. In 1962, bordar problems between
the Chinese and the Indians flared up into open warfare.
The mauling the Indians took gave them some proclivity
toward dealing with the Chinese 1 enemies, the Soviets. In
1965, the Indians fought a war with the Pakistanis which
ended in a stalemate, and demonstrated to the Indians their
need for mere modern forces. During the 1965 war, the
Chinese maintained geed relations with the Pakistanis, and
the Americans and British imposed an arms embargo on the
Indians. This drove the Indians even further into the arms
cf the Scviets. In 1971, this close relationship became
official, with the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation. This treaty with India was an open warning to
the PRC to not interfere in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani crisis.
One cf the missions for the Soviet task forces leaving
Vladivostok December 6-7 may have been a warning to the
Chinese. [Pef. 147]. The Soviets sold the Indians 8 Petya
frigates, 8 Osa missile boats, 8 Foxtrot submarines, and 4
Polocny amphibious ships. In return, the Indians leased to
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the Soviets the port cf Vishakhapatnam, which they modern-
ized and developed into a submarine base. Naval facilities
were also irade available at Port Blaire in the Andaman
Islands. This is a direct link between a Soviet naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ccean and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. It
must fcs pointed out, however, that it was also related to
the U.S. position in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and that
the Indians remain vociferously non-aligned, despite the
Treaty and the accessible facilities.
It had to be assumed that in the event of a war with
China, the Trans-Siberian railway would be cut, and that
the Far Eastern Front would have to be supplied by sea.
This introduced the requirement to protect such ship-
ments from the Chinese Navy, wnich includes the third
largest submarine force in the world. But this threat
to shipping reached back to the north-western parts of
the Indian Ocean, where it could be posed by Chinese
forces using friendly bases (eg Pakistan or, in those
days, South Yemen), by U.S. forces, or even by regional
navies- [Bef. 148].
The Soviets grew to fear U.S.-PRC collusion, particu-
larly as the Sine-Soviet breach widened. [Hef. 150].
The Soviets have a fear of the continued growth cf
Chinese seapower. They are in competition with the Chinese
for leadership in the Afro- Asian world. The Chinese are a
colored race, don't require base rights in exchange for
their favors, and their ideology fits Africa better than
does the Soviets*. This makes them a tough diplomatic
adversary for the Soviets in the Third World. [ Ref . 151].
The Soviet Union additionally seeks to encircle China.
China's diplomatic presence in East Africa, as well as the
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imperatives of maintaining a non-aligned status discourage
the granting of large-scale port facilities to the super-
powers by Third World states. [Ref. 152].
D. INTERDICTION OF/REACTION TO U.S. FORCES
The SNICS* mission is to interdict U.S. forces on their
way to support or resupply land forces and allies in the
Middle East (ie Central Command forces, or RDJTr) , cr to
provide a counterpresence to U.S. naval forces reacting to
crises or engaging in naval diplomacy. [Ref. 154]. An
example of this took place during the Bengali War of
Secession in 1971, where the Indians invaded East Pakistan
to aid the Bengali liberation forces. A British force
comprised of the carrier Eagle, commando carrier Albion, and
escorts and support ships were in the Arabian Sea supporting
the Eritish withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. They
responded to the war, and moved toward the Bay of Bengal.
The normal Soviet relief force arrived and began to shadow
the British forces. The U. S. formed a CV task force around
Enterprise, drawing them from operations off the coast of
Vietnam, and sent them into the Indian Ocean. The Soviets,
anticipating this American reaction, responded socn after
with a task force built around a Kresta I and a Kashin,
which shadowed the Enterprise task force, and was presumably
ready to interpose themselves betweent the U.S. forces and
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the crisis. The war, however, was over before everyor.3 was
fully in place, and the extra units on both sides withdrew.
The Director of Naval Intelligence cited an increase in the
number of warships deployed to the Indian Ocean, including
cruise missile submarines, saying that they served to
counter U.S. carrier forces, as well as to support their
clients. [Ref. 160]. This underscores the interdiction/
reaction mission, as well as the previously discussed
mission cf naval diplomacy.
The Soviets have naval requirements in the Indian
Ocean, since, in the event of world war, they most prob-
ably plan to move south to control the Gulf area, and
naval forces will be needed in the seaward approaches to
fend off assaults by U.S. strike carriers and amphibious
groups. [Bef . 161 ].
Cne cf the factors upon which the U.S. strategy, of
effecting a delaying action in central Iran against a Soviet
invasion, is dependent is, "the ability of U.S. naval forces
to prevent the interdicitcn of the Strait of Hormuz by
Soviet submarines and Backfire bombers." [Ref. 162].
Soviet policy is to keep a rather small naval force in
the Indian Ocean that can be quickly enlarged in times of
crisis. [Ref. 163].
Given the Soviet perception of naval power as an exten-
sion of land power, the primary purpose of the Soviet
Indian Ocean force is to protect the seaward flank in
the event of a Soviet invasion of the Gulf states.
[Ref. 164].
Their role is to play an interposit ional role, deterring




Backfire bombers would stand prepared to threaten any
U.S. naval action, or at least to deter it. The Soviet Navy
could attempt to mine the approaches to Abadan as well as
the strait cf Hormuz. [ Hef . 166].
The Soviets increased their naval and air activity in
the Indian Ocean and adjacent land areas due to a concern
over the U.S. buildup of naval facilities on Diego Garcia,
and fears of unrest in Iran and Afghanistan spilling over
the borders into the Soviet Union. [Sef. 167]. In general,
they reacted to the 1979-1981 crisis period in the Indian
Ocean by increasing their naval strength there.
Subseguent to the release of the U.S. hostages by Iran,
and coincident with the gradual reduction of U.S. naval
forces, the Soviet naval posture in the Indian
Ocean underwent a similar reduction. [fief. 168].
E. SOMHAKY
1 . Ant i^SSB
H
Much of the writing en this mission seems to go to
great length detailing its importance to the Soviets, and
then go en to say that there is no evidence of the U.S.
patrolling the Indian Ocean with SSBNs. The general conclu-
sion to be wrought is that one of the Soviets* initial
reasons fcr entering the Indian Ocean was a fear of the SSBN
threat. In the 1960s, the U.S. built its VLF communications
staticn on Australia's Northwest Cape, and came to an
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agreement with the Eritish over the development of Diego
Garcia. These were roth developments that the Soviets could
and should have seen as preparations for Indian Ocean SSBN
deployments. The prioritization of the Pacific Fleet SSBNs
to receive the then new A- 3 ballistic missile was also an
indicator.
As time went by, though, and the anticipated threat
never arrived, the anti-SSBN mission lost some of its
frenzy. The Soviets admitted that O.S. SSBNs hadn't
deployed to the Indian Ocean. The cost of maintaining the
large numbers of platforms necessary in the Indian Ocean to
meet that threat was prohibitively great, * so there is a
state of uneasy tension surrounding the anti-SSBN mission.
The Soviets, with their hydrographic ships in the Indian
Ocean, are preparing for a future contingency. The U.S. has
not put them to ^he test yet, but a change of philosophy or
strategy could quickly do so.
2. Ecs t-O . K . Vacuum
This has been stated as a theory to explain the
Soviets 1 naval extension into the Indian Ocean. The main
stimulus for this conclusion is the coincidence between The
British withdrawal and the Soviet extension. The fact is,
though, that the Soviets maintain the Squadron only at great
*That cost is even greater now with Trident, and the
resulting enormous increase in the area of ocean which would
have to be covered.
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cost, a cost which was even grea-er during its early years.
Filling a vacuum is net a very satisfying reward for such an
investment. Instead, the Soviets had interests of their own
in the regicn, some vital and some not, and the British
withdrawal simply made it possible to move in sarlier than
they would have otherwise. It is unreasonable to believe
that the Soviet Union, a superpower with important interests
in the Indian Ocean region and a growing blue-water navy,
wouldn't have eventually made the extension, even in the
absence cf a British withdrawal. In fact, one of the
reasons the Soviets were so careful at first was to avoid
provoking the British into delaying their withdrawal. In
this way, the mission of the Squadron is less as an instru-
ment of zero-sum great power conflict than it is an
instrument of Soviet policy, whether it is working in a
zero-sum node or not.
3 • The Chinese Threat
The PRC, along with the Western bloc, is one of the
Soviet Union's two main rivals for world power. China has
the world's third largest submarine force, and is closely
allied with Pakistan, which stands along the Soviets' vital
Indian Ocean routes, and has a warming relationship with the
U.S. This is one reason for the Soviets' fervent desire to
maintain its relationship as the main ally of India, an
enemy cf both the PRC and Pakistan. The Soviets have made
deliveries cf naval hardware to India, have used access to
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some Indian bases (on a limited basis), and acted tc inter-
dict U.S. and British reaction forces during the 1971
Indo-Eakistani War. Most of the posturing in this southern
Asian arena has been diplomatic, but the Soviets use their
naval forces in support of this diplomacy. The stimulus for
this, in addition tc a normal drive to increase its influ-
ence in the world in general, is the Sino-Soviet conlict.
Not only does the PHC threaten the Trans-Siberian railway
and the Indian Ocean sea lanes, but it is the main reason
the sea lanes are important in the first place. The Soviet
Indian Ocean SLOCs are a major route for supplying the 45 or
so Soviet ground divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, as
well as their bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.
a • Interdiciton cf/Reaction to U.S. Forces
This appears to be the Soviets* primary reactive
mission. They reacted to ths British and the Americans
during the 1971 Indc-Pakis tani War. They reacted to U.S.
carrier forces in the Indian Ocean during the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. They reacted to anticipated U.S. fcrces
in ccnnecticn with the Iranian hostage crisis. They built
up the Sguadron further in anticipation of a U.S. reaction
to their mcve into Afghanistan. They have thus shown a
consistent pattern of reacting to the movements of U.S.
naval fcrces in the Indian Ocean in connection with a
crisis. Yet, the reaction is as much a function of the
crisis as it is of the American forces. Soviet reaction
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forces in the Indian Ocean have generally left the region
before the U.S. forces which they were reacting to.
A case in point is the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The
crisis was developing long before the Soviets assembled
their task forces. Once the Indians invaded East Pakistan,
there was nc doubt cf their ability to easily defeat the
Pakistanis, so there was no need for the Soviets to send SSM
platforms to help them. The departuer date of the second
Soviet -cask force from Vladivostok indicates that they began
to assemble it prior to the U.S. action cf marshalling a
carrier task force east of the Strait of Malacca. After the
conflict was ended, the Soviet task force left the Indian
Ocean befcre the U.S. task force did. The pattern, then, is
a reaction to the combination of crisis and U.S. or Western
action, or anticipated action, with withdrawal upon the
removal cf one of these determinants. There have beer-
crises in the Indian Ocean without a Soviet reaction. There
have been strong U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean
without a Soviet reaction. There has not been a esse of a
crisis and a U.S. response or anticipated response without a
Soviet reaction. These, then, are the keys for the U.S.
planner: crisis, U.S. response, or a reasonable expectation




Rather than attempt to organize this chapter by theory
or subject, it appears that the least distracting method is
simply tc take each cf the six authors (seven sources) , and
give a summary of tie points in their amides salient to
the present discussion. Ideas and quotations from the arti-
cles have been chosen in such a manner as to derive the
essence of the authors 1 points. Some typical Soviet-Marxist
rhetoric has crept into this, but this was allowed when it
lent emphasis to what the author was saying. Without it, it
was feared that the ideas would not properly be communi-
cated. At the end cf the chapter, table I correlates the
Soviet writings with the U.S. writers 1 theories.
The first author. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov is the Admiral
of the Fleet of the Scviet Union, and is therefor? the man
most responsible for the operations of the Soviet Navy. He
wrote two becks, both of which were reviewed for salience to
the present discussion. The remainder of the authors cited
in this chapter were drawn from the Center for Naval
Analysis Abstracts. The method used was to review each
article written by a Soviet author with the words "Indian
Ocean" in the title. The title search went back to the
beginning of 1979, and articles which proved to be cf little




In the last 3 years, some 1,000 Soviet combatants and
auxiliaries hav? visited the ports of 60 countries in
Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. More than
2,000,000 Scviet officers and non-rated men have visited the
shores cf foreign states.
We also cannot remain indifferent to the expansion
of the basing of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and
carrier forces on the Japanese Islands, in Italy, in the
Indian Ocean, and in other areas of the World Ocean, for
all of this powerful and widely dispersed military
organization is directed against the USSR and the coun-
tries of the Socialist community. [Ref. 169].
Ihe Indian Ocean is playing an increasing role in
the econciFies of the developing countries of South Asia and
Eastern Africa. In the countries of its basin live seme
1,000 million persons. It is the third largest ocean, with
an area cf almost 75 million square kilometers (over 20^ of
the wcrld ocean) . Ihe Indian Ocean takes about a tenth of
the world's shipping. The economic importance of the Indian
Ocean lies essentially in the fact that along it run world
trade routes linking Europe and America with South Asia,
Eastern Africa, Australia, and the oil-bearing regions of
the Near and Middle East. Across the Indian Ocean run the
routes frcm the Black Sea and Baltic ports of the USSR to
the ports of the Far East and also to India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, and other countries. The





The west practices gunboat diplomacy in the Indian Ocean
in order tc reap profits from its rich territory. The
permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean has become
an integral part of the aggressive strategy of world imperi-
alism. These actions are patently anti-Soviet in nature.
In this light, consider the construction of U.S. bases, etc
in the very proximity to the southern borders of the USSR,
or the permanent presence in the Indian Ocean of warships
with cuclear missiles capable of hitting soviet territory,
and the resultant opportunities for violating the
inalienable right of the Soviet Union to freedom of naviga-
tion in the open sea. It should not be forgotten that the
Indian Ocean is the sole warm-water route linking the Soviet
ports of Europe and the Far East.
The idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was
first brought out at the Third Non-aligned Nations Summit,
held in Lusaka in September, 1970. This called for freedom
from great power competition and military bases, either
ground, or naval and air. &t the suggestion of Sri Lanka,
the zone of peace idea was adopted by the 26th session of
the U.N. General Assembly on 16 December, 1971. These
debates, though, were erroneous in equating the USSR with
the U.S. as a cause of the tension in the Indian Ocean.
The USSR has no military bases in the Indian Ocean and never
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strived to acquire them. It does not deploy its strategic
navy there, and does not resort to intimidation cf littoral
states with its naval strength.
Foreign bases in the Indian Ocean are a major threat to
the security of the region. "The Soviet Union has never had
and has no intention now of building military bases in the
Indian Ocean." [Ref. 171]i
Since 1972 , the U.S. sent large operational naval forces
to the Indian Ocean nearly twenty times for periods of up to
two months. Presently, several dozens of U.S. warships,
including aircraft carriers, are permanently stationed
there. The government of Mauritius is the legitimate owner
of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia can launch B-52 strategic
bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, and has
silo launchers for ballistic missiles.
China has been sabotaging the peace of the Indian Ocean
through increasing tensions, and through propaganda,
claiming the aggressive nature of India. With the develop-
ment of its navy, China would seek its broad applicaticn on
a global scale, and for its political purposes in the
region. The South Fleet of China alone consists of 300
combatants, and continues to expand.
Provacative U.S. actions in reaction to national libera-
tion movements include:
1. Henry Kissinger not ruling out the use of military




2. In 1977, Presidential Directive 18 sanctioning the
creation of a mcbile force for brush-fire wars, the
beginning of the Rapid Deployment Force,
3. In 1S79, there was talk of forming a U.S. Fifth Fleet
in the Indian Ocean.
The main gcal of these operations is to seize major
oilfields of Southwest Asia, and ro hold them until the
arrival cf the regular units. According to Presidential
Memorandum 51, a "limited use" of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East is envisaged. [Bef. 172].
C. LADOZHSKT
The U.S. broke off talks with the Soviet Union in 1978
en limiting and reducing military activity in the Indian
Ocean. In the zone cf peace talks, the USSR stressed that
the principle cf freedom of navigation should not be
violated. The USSR was finally able to vote in favor of the
zone cf peace resolution at the 32nd Session of the U.N
General Assembly, due to a softening of the wording abcut
the rivalry cf the great powers.
The Chinese hegemonists are making a determined effort
to rearm Pakistan, along with the U.S. The PRC ' s military
presence in the Indian Ocean will inevitably lead to the





Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean have never
resorted tc a demonstration of their power and have not
threatened the security of the littoral states. The Soviet
military presence there has always been much less than that
cf the U.S. and its allies.
The Soviet Onion also has political interests in the
Indian Ocean. It supported freedom from colonial domina-
tion, and now supports the new srates against imperialism,
neo-cclcnialism, etc.
Major Soviet interes-s in the Indian Ocean include:
1. Preventing the appearance of a strategic threat from
the southern direction, particularly carriers
carrying nuclear weapons,
2. Sea routes linking the OSSR with the littoral states,
3. Sea routes linking the European USSR with the Far
East,
4. The USSR conducting work in connection with space
exploration,
5. Part of the DSSR*s research of the Worlds Ocean is
conducted in the Indian Ocean. [ Ref . 173]-
D. LOGOySKCI
The U.S. Fifth Fleet operates out of Diego Garcia. It
also has a number of peripheral bases, including Simcnstown
in South Africa. The U.S. has involved its West European
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allies as well, leading tea geographical escalation as a
part cf its r.ew strategy. Over 2,500 nuclear warheads have
teen emplacsd on U.S. ships patrolling the seas bordering on
Asia and Africa. [ Hef . 174].
E. SEMYCNO?
The waters of the Indian Ocean and its shores and
islands are relatively close to the USSR, considering the
radius cf the effectiveness of modern strategic attack
weapons. Moreover, the only year-round sea route connecting
the eastern part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes
through the Indian Ocean.
Zbigniew Brzezinski developed the concept of "arches of
instability" in the region of the Indian Ocean, the meaning
of which can be understood as nothing other than a call for
the use cf armed force against the peoples of the coastal
countries, who are striving to attain social progress or
emancipation from neocolcnial dependence. [Ref. 175].
F. YEFREBC?
Naturally, the peace-loving forces cannot react indiffe-
rently to the Pentagon's threatening actions. The 0.5. is
attempting to turn back the march of history with its
gunboat diplomacy. In 1974, U.S. Secretary of Defence
Schlesinger threatened to seize the oil fields in the region
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by fcrce if the oil exporting states "hurt the industrial
world." As cf April of this year <1980>, the total number
of U.S. military vessels in the Indian ccsan reached 31,
including the Coral Sea, Nimitz, Kitty Hawk, and Midway
aircraft carriers, and missile cruisers and warships with
24,000 servicemen on board. One part of them patrols the
Bahrain area, another the western portion of the Arabian
Sea, and a third the region near Karachi.
The "Carter Doctrine" is an offshoot of the dream of
John Foster Dulles tc extend the "nuclear umbrella" every-
where possible. The government of Kuwait, for example,
declared that there exists no threat, other than the
American cne, to the region. The American threats are mere
than sabre-rattling. [Ref. 176].
G. DISCUSSION
It is difficult sometimes to wade through Scviet
polemics, but Ladozhky*s article summed up nicely the Scviet
views of their interests in the Indian Ocean. There was a
great deal cf talk about Western and Chinese imperialists,
hegemonists, neo-cclonialists, etc., but the following
outline fairly well sums up the real heart of the issue in
the Soviets* minds.
1. Preventing the appearance of a strategic threat from




2. Sea routes linking the USSR with the littoral stages,
3. Sea routes linking the European USSR with the Far
East,
4. .The USSR conducting work in connection with space
exploration,
5. Part of the QSSR's research of the World's Ocean is
conducted in the Indian Ocean. [Ref- 177],
Table I and table 5push2 on the following pages clearly
show a predominant concern with the presence of U.S. forces.
In fact, all six of the authors cite it. Two of the authcrs
cited the legitimate political concerns of the Soviet Union
in the Indian Ocean, which was used to correlate with the
naval diplomacy mission. None gave credit for U.S. legiti-
mate political ccnceins in the Indian Ocean, but called all
U.S. military operations in the region imperialistic and
militaristic. The double standard even goes so far as to
have led to the Soviets not signing the Zone of Peace agree-
ment for a number of years due to the language it once had
calling the Indian Ocean as an arena of great power
conflict. It is interesting here that all cited the U.S.'
"imperialist" presence, but only two cited their own legiti-
mate interests.
The seccnd most stated concerns were these of protection
of Soviet sea lanes and of an SSBN concern, with four
authors citing each. The sea lanes were considered impor-
tant for the supplying of their Far Eastern provinces, and
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for trading with important Southeast Asian friends. In the
absence cf a specific source of the nuclear threat, a
mention cf that threat was considered to include an SS3Ns.
Admiral Gcrshkov specifically mentioned nuclear submarines,
though net SSBNs by name. Ladozhsky links the nuclear
threat with carriers, but not with submarines. Yefremov
mentions carriers and missiles, but. doesn't state a nuclear
nature. From this, it appears that the Soviets are very
concerned with strategic attack fram the Indian Ocean,
whether from carriers, submarines, or cruise missiles. The
specific launch platform is less of a concern than the
threat itself. It would be reasonable to assume that,
should an SSBN threat become apparent, they would pursue it
with the same vigor they do the surface threat, which is
present.
The Chinese threat was mentioned twice, in vehement
language, including referenced to Chinese military power
present in the Indian Ocean. The space program and the
fishing fleet were both mentioned once.
One trend that can be generalized from the writings is
that the Soviets defend their legitimate interests in the
Indian Ocean, as in the right to freedom of navigation on
the high seas, and their rights as a sovereign nation to
pursue these interests. At the same time, they apply the
double standard to label any similar U.S. action as militar-
istic, implying a lack of legitimate U.S. interests in the
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region. The third generalization arises our of the mission
areas that are not cited by the Soviet authors. These are
the areas that could be labelled as aggressive, including
disruption of Western SLOCs, seizure of territory,
warfighting, and filling a political vacuum left by the
British. To be "filling the vacuum", they would ostensibly
be taking Britain's place as the regional imperialists. The
final missicn that was not mentioned was that of bureau-
cratic leverage, which would obviously not be mentioned,
even if it were true. One mission area mentioned by
Ladozhsky, but not the Western writers, was that of
supporting the USSR's research of the world ocean, part of
which is conducted in the Indian Ocean. This cculd be
related to the fishing fleet, but is sufficiently vague to

















































































VI. SUMMARY,, ANA LYSIS r_AND_CQNC_LUSIpNS
The Carter administration, through 1978, had been
pursuing the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
This is an idea that was and is being pushed by the ncn-
aligned movement, the United Nations third world contingent,
and the Soviet anion. After the fall of the Shah in 1979,
however, the U.S. reversed its position with respect to the
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and began to build its mili-
tary capability in the area through the augmentation of U.S.
naval forces in the region, the formation of the Rapid
Deployment Fcrce concept, and a push for increased basing
rights in the region in places' like D-iego Garcia, Eertera,
and Mombasa. [Ref. 178].
This was indicative of a greater need for an increased
U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf
region. The Carter administration adopted the idea, and the
Reagan administration has been striving to bring plans for
the increase to fruition. The Soviets, on the other hand,
have a much lesser need for such an increase. From air
bases in Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan, or from Afghanistan,
they cnly have to fly 600 cr 1200 miles, respectively, to
important Gulf regions. Meanwhile, their airborne division
capability is approximately four times that of the U.S.
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[Hef. 179]. Soviet land access to the Persian Gulf is
approximately the same as that of its airborne forces in
distance. The U.S., meanwhile, is approximately 12,000 sea
miles frcm the Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope. In view
of this, it is obvious that the Soviets don't need the sea
access as much as the West does. Therefore, they are still
pushing strcngly the zcne of peace idea, as was discussed in
chapter III. In the absence of outside forces, then, the
Soviets dcn't need naval forces in the Indian Ocean for a
warfighting capability. During wartime, they need naval
forces in the Indian Ocean for reacting to U.S. military
moves in the region (ie interdiction), or for operating in
direct support of land-based forces, or for reacting to
opportunities.
It is now time to return to the three questions posed in
chapter ere:
1. To what degree is the Squadron's mission active, or
reactive?
2. To the degree that it is active, what are its
missions?
3. To the degree that it is reactive, what is it
reacting to, and what patterns, if any, can be
discerned?
Sc, is the Squadron's mission active or reactive? The
active missions of the Squadron, discussed in chapter one,
were disruption of Western SLOCs, protection of Scviet
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SLOCs , naval diplomacy, space program, bureaucratic
leverage, fishing fleet, seizure of territory, and
warf ighting.
Disruption of Western SLOCs is definitely one of the
Soviet Navy's missions. It is unlikely, however, ^hat they
would attempt to create a blockade or raid the merchant
shipping in the Indian Ocean, short of general East-West
hostilities. Except when operating relatively close tc air
bases in Afghanistan, and assuming that they don't gain
access tc operational air bases elsewhere in the region
(there is a possibility in Ethiopia) , the SNIOS is vulner-
able tc Western attack.
In addition, such operations would require inordinate
numbers cf platforms, necessitating a drawdown of fcrces
elsewhere in the world. This is something the Soviets are
unlikely tc do. Their primary mission is to defend the
Soviet hctreland. If operating an anti-SLOC campaign in the
Indian Ocean would detract from their ability to perform the
strategic defense mission in more important areas, such as
the Central Front of Europe, then they are extremely
unlikely tc do it. As the Soviet Navy follows a trend of
procuring smaller numbers cf more capable platforms, this
unwillingness to send large numbers of ships to the Indian
Ocean will grow stronger, particularly in the absence of a
direct, present threat. And, they could expect that such a
campaign in peacetime would quickly lead to a condition of
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war. Therefore, a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign would only take
place as a part of a warfighting campaign.
Even in a hot war situation, the Soviets are unlikely to
invest an inordinate effort in cutting the sea lanes in the
Indian Ocean. By cutting the lanes in the northern Atlantic
or the Mediterranean, Soviet naval forces retain an extra
degree of flexibility that they don't have in the distant
waters cf the Indian Ocean. They can change missions
quickly and fall back in defense of the home waters, if
necessary. Of course, this requires first winning the
battle of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, but any
attempt tc conduct a lcng-tarm sea lane interdiction
campaign in the Indian Ocean would also require a victory in
the Mediterranean. Admiral Wegener made the point when he
described maritime positions vs stratsgic positions.
If all this is true, then why do the Soviets appear to
be trying so hard tc place their forces astride the sea
routes in the Indian Ocean? There are several answers to
this questicn:
1. That is where they have been granted facilities
access, first in Berbera, Aden, and Urnm Qasr, and
then in Dahlak and Aden. Even in Aden, though, they
haven't been able to get the unrestricted access that
they desire,
2. It is the closest place in the Indian Ocean to the
Soviet anion and the Squadron's sources of supply,
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3. It is proximate to the Middle East and Western
forces, affording the opportunity to conduct surveil-
lance with relatively little effort,
4. It is proximate to tha Suez Canal/Red Sea basin,
which they would have to control in wartime in crder
to make their Indian Ocean presence a viable cne , for
whatever missions they might have in mind,
5. Related to the Suez Canal, it sits astride their cwn
sea lanes to the Soviet Far East.
There is little debate over whether protection of Soviet
SLOCs is cne of the Squadron's missions. A great deal of
Soviet shipping transits along those lanes, and they consti-
tute the only truly reliable method of resupplying their Far
East forces at the present time. The Soviet writers summa-
rized in chapter III made . innumerable references to the
importance of these lanes to the Soviet East fcsian effort.
There is likewise little debate over the Squadrons
naval diplomacy mission. The only real debate is the
Soviets' general policies and aims in the region which the
Squadron is supposed to be supporting. Soviet Middle
Eastern and African policy is beyond the scope of this
discussion, but a few basic policy goals may be accepted:
1. The discrediting of the U.S.,
2. Support of revolutionary and subversive movements,
3. Encouraging ncn-alignment in pro-Western states,
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4. Encouraging pro-Soviet inclinations in non-aligned
states,
5. Providing an alternative to the West,
6. Protecting friendly states from subversion and
outside aggression.
Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean are heavily
geared toward naval diplomacy because of the preponderance
of the Third World on its on its littoral, because of its
closeness to the Middle East, and because it is relatively
safe with respect to the possible provocation of a higher-
level conflict with the West.
There is no doubt of the space program mission. The
Sguadron has included Space Event Support Ships (SESS) a
majority of the time. The Soviet writers also mentioned
this mission as being important.
The bureaucratic leverage theory is interesting, but not
too convincing. It is possible that Admiral Gorshkov uses
the Indian Ocean as a perceived threat in order to wrest
funding away from the other services, but the threat has to
be convincing for the ploy to work. The generals, after
all, are not blind. If the threat is convincing enough for
the Admiral to get the funding, then it is the perceived
threat and not the bureaucratic process that is important
for us tc consider, at least at this level of analysis.
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There is no doubt that the Soviet Union considers the
Indian Ocean to be vital to its ability to supply its citi-
zens with adequate protein. It is not so obvious, however,
how much cf a naval presence, if any, is necessary to
protect the fishing fleet. There have been incidents
involving claims of territorial waters against the fishing
fleet outside the Indian Ocean basin, but none cf them
required a Scviet naval task force to remain on staticn to
protect them. The main requirement here, outside of a major
incident between the Soviet Union and a littoral state over
fishing, is in the realm of naval diplomacy^ This diplomacy
helps to gain aggreements for the Soviet Union by which the
fishing fleet can operate more efficiently. Some examples
of this are the agreement with Mauritius for refueling and
crew transfer, and repair agreements with the PDRY.
The seizure of territory mission is very difficult to
determine. It probably cannot be done with the information
available at this classification. The Soviet Navy has a
mission of taking and holding territory in conjunction with
operations with the Scviet Army or Air Forces. It is not
likely to perform such operations outside this context.
Therefore, it would perform this mission in the Indian Ocean
only in conjunction with Soviet military moves in the Middle
East, in Central or Southern Asia (as it did during the
invasion cf Afghanistan) , or in conjunction with allied
operations in the PDRY (as it did during the Dhofari
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rebellion) cr Ethiopia (against the Eritrean Guerrillas).
The guesticn of whether or not the Soviets might invade
toward the Persian Gulf is outside the scope of this paper,
though if a definite, consistent relationship could fce shown
of the Squadron building up preceding a Soviet military land
action in the region, it would be very significant. The
Soviet buildup in conjunction with the invasion of
Afghanistan was not distinct enough to prove such a compar-
ison. Also, the sample is still small, dsspits the fact
that the Squadron has been operating in the Indian Ocean for
15 years. Finally, a planner seeing a buildup couldn't be
sure if it was in preparation for a land operation support
mission cr for something else. In any case, a buildup
should alert the planner to some upcoming event.
The Squadron's warfighting mission, by the very defini-
tion of naval forces, is unarguable. Even the merchant
marine will play a role in a conflict, particularly an
East-West war. Their problems in fighting a war were
discussed under disruptions of Western SLOCs. In time of
war, the Squadron^ operations will likely revolve around
support of land operations and the interdiction of Western
reaction forces. This is different from the reactive
mission of interdicting Western forces. In the reactive
mission, they would be reacting to events outside their
control, while in the active mission, they would be antici-
pating Western reactions to their already conceived clans.
100

Their reactions to Western moves in the pas- seem tc indi-
cate an anti-CVEG rcle f with cruise missile cruisers and
submarines entering the Indian Ocean to counter U.S. carrier
forces that are perceived t c be a present threat.
Of the reactive missions, the anti-SSBN mission is by
far the most commonly cited. Except for two nagging facts,
it would appear that it is not a major mission. The argu-
ment about numbers of SSBNs, distances to be travelled from
home port tc patrol area, and the resulting short tiie on
station is very convincing. The advent of the Trident
missile makes it even more so, because of the fewer number
of platforms and the longer range of the missile, making the
SSBN bastion concept more realistic. The nagging facts are
the VIF station of Australia's Northwest Cape, announced in
1963, and Diego Garcia. If the U.S. didn't intend to
operate SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, why was the VLF station
built? There is no readily apparent reason, because VIF is
used for submarine communications, and the station would not
appear tc be optimal for use in ether directions. For SSBN
operations anywhere else than the Indian Ocean, there would
te mere efficient and flexible places to build the station.
The second fact is that Diego Garcia is capable of
supporting SSBNs. It apparertly hasn't been done to date,
but the U.S. could rather rapidly begin operating SSENs from
the island. This wculd negate the argument of long cruise
times to the patrol area. Such operations would, of course,
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be more vulnerable tc air attack xhan an SSBN basticn closer
to the continental O.S.
The Soviets definitely reacted to the British with-
drawing from the Persian Gulf region. Their beginning
operations so soon after the British announcement, and the
independence of Aden and the Aden Protectorate could net be
a coincidence. Yet, filling a political vacuum is not
really a true mission, separate from simply supporting the
political goals of the Soviet Union. There must have been
another reason for constituting the presence. The Soviets
must have perceived seme benefit, especially in view of the
difficulty they had in maintaining a growing sguadror. in
that distant corner of the world. Still, in the absence of
the British withdrawal, it is likely that the Soviets would
have delayed their permanent presence for a while longer,
though it was inevitable eventually. As McGwire points out,
the Soviet naval extension into the Indian Ocean was a
logical development from their naval extension into the
Mediterranean some ysars earlier. [Ref. 180].
There is no doubt that the Soviets are disturbed by the
Chinese in the Indian Ocean. What is less easy to see is
whether they are reacting to a Chinese threat or taking an
active, aggressive role against the Chinese in the Indian
Ocean. It is probable that there is some element of truth
in both propositions. The Chinese threat emanates from two
directions. The first is through Pakistan, a strong ally of
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the Chinese. The Soviets have worked to limit Pakistani
power through Afgharistan and India, but mainly through
India, who has also fought the Chinese directly. Part of
the Soviet relationship with India is naval diplomacy and
sales of naval hardware, but this is a very small part of
the Soviets 1 relationship with India.
The ether Chinese threat is its submarine force, which
is one of the largest in the world. It is limited in its
range because it is primarily deisel, but it does lie along
the Soviet Far Eastern sea lanes, and is not far from the
approaches to the Indian Ocean.
The Soviets have consistently reacted in an interdiction
role to U.S. incursions into the Indian Ocean. A prime
example is their operations during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani
War. Tfce U.S. sent a CVBG to support a political mission,
and the Soviets were able to counter with an anti-carrier
battle group built around a cruise missile cruiser.
Interestingly, they also reacted to the British carrier-
centered force that had been present in the Indian Ocean for
some time. They didn't react to the presence of the British
forces themselves, tut to the coincidence of the forces and
a crisis that they perceived as being of vital interest to
themselves (Indian-Pakistani-Chinese triangle). This may
help tc explain why later, in the 1973 Arab- Israeli War and
the 1979-81 Iranian and Afghan crises, they initially
reacted strongly and capably to Western naval forces, but
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seemed tc lose interest as the crisis eased, despite the
fact that the Western forces remained en station for more
extended periods of time. Surveillance operations were
continued, but the anti-carrier forces were allowed to rede-
ploy elsewhere.
The bottom line, then, is as expected. The Squadron has
both active and reactive missions. The relative strengths
between the mission categories appear to be fairly balanced,
meaning that their overall mission is not primarily one or
the other. This toe is pretty much as expected. A naval
force must always be prepared to react to an emergency, so
the mission structure must make allowances for those contin-
gencies, necessarily limiting the active missions which the
fcrce can take en at any given period of time. This is
likely to fluctuate with the relative political-military
tensions of the time.
A. ACTIVE MISSIONS
The primary active missions of the Squadron are naval
diplomacy and warfighting. Naval diplomacy is its primary
peacetime mission, designed to support the political line of
the central Soviet heirarchy. Incidental to this powerfully
important mission are the mere adminstrative missions of
supporting the fishing fleet in whatever way they require,
supporting the space program, giving the naval heirarchy
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bargaining power in Moscow, and gaining experience and an
operational knowledge of local conditions.
In time of war, the Squadrons active missions are to
interdict Western seaborne reinforcement and resupply
efforts reacting tc a Soviet invasion, and to seize
territory and choke points coincident with land operations.
This is where the SIOC question is rigntly placed. The
Soviets would likely stop the oil flow to the Wesx as much
as possible, but they generally think in terms of a short
war, and the cutoff cf oil is not so critical in that scen-
ario. What is critical is the CVBG threatening his land
forces. Therefore, the Squadron will only pursue the merc-
hant traffic insofar as it does not interfere with the far
more critical (at least until the second month of the war)
task cf anti-carrier warfare.
E. REACTIVE OBJECTS AND PATTERNS
To the degree that the Squadron is reactive, what is it
reacting to, and what patterns, if any, can be discerned?
Looking again at Watson's analysis of the standard squadron
makeup, [Ref. 181].. it is difficult to imagine that the
Soviets are reacting to a submarine threat. Yet, it is
something that they are obviously thinking about in at least
a future tense. The Squadron's hydrographic research ships
collect the information necessary to fight a modern ASW
105

tattle, and the IL-38 May aircraft at Aden and Ethiopia
greatly improve their AS w stance in the Arabian Sea
vicinity. Should the threat finally materialize, the
Soviets should be able to adjust to it without too much
difficulty, though their present capability in ASW in even
the best cf circumstances is suspect.
The Chinese threat, like the SSBN threat, is potential
more than actual. The Chinese are allies of the Pakistanis,
but that alliance poses a minimal present threat. Instead,
it appears that, through aggressive diplomacy, bcth naval
and otherwise, the Soviets are carrying out a campaign
against the Chinese that appears to be more active than
reactive. Pakistan is presently quite weak in comparison
with India, and must move very carefully in its relations
with China and the West.
The major reactive mission, then, is the interdiction of
U.S. forces operating in some other mode than reacting
directly to Soviet moves. It may be useful at this point to
restate a set of statistics from chapter IV to indicate a
reactive nature of the Squadron to any who might still
tremble at the "frightening" Soviet buildup in the Indian
Ocean.
By mid- 1982, the Soviet ship count averaged about 25,
and by year* s end had fallen to approximately 20, with
not mere than two major surface combatants in the area
for any sustained period. Within the first two months
of 1983, the Soviets were maintaining only about 15
ships in the Indian Ocean, including a ' Kashin 1 -class
guided missile destroyer and an 'Echo-II' submarine.
Most of the remaining ships (were) of the small auxil-
iary variety. [Ref. 182].
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Even with Soviet trocps still fighting in Afghanistan, the
crisis had eased, sc the Squadron declined in numbers and
composition from over 30 tc about 15 ships, less than the
normal pre-crisis squadron of 20-22 ships.
Anticipating a U.S. reaction would also require them to
protect their own SLOCs. It is clear that the line between
some active and seme reactive missions is indistinct,
depending fcr the mest part on the frame of mind of the
Soviet planner. For instance, interdiction of U.S. forces,
whether active or reactive, involves the same physical
action. The difference is that, in active interdiction, the
Soviet planner has simply taken a U.S. response into account
in his larger invasion plan, while in reactive interdiction,
the U.S. fcrce is responding to a third party or event. The
reason the distinction is important is in helping the
planner to determine what the proper action or reaction
might be, depending en the state of tensions. If it is an
active Soviet mission, then the likely U.S. action would be
to destroy or outmaneuver the Squadron. If it is reactive,
the U.S. might wish to withdraw, in order to reduce the





The tables and figures on the following pages ar
e
included fcr general reference informa-ion. Tables II
through VI detail information on Soviet port visits zo
Indian Ocean area ports from 1962 to 1980. [Ref. 183].
Table VII gives a quick idea of the Squadron's operations
from the Spring cf 1968 to the Winter of 1973-7U.
[Ref- 184]. Figure A.1 [Ref. 185]. offers a comparison of
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TOTALS OF INDIAN OCEAN POET VISITS BY PORT, 1962-1980
Tolll Ship Deye
2. Iln, Feople'e Daaaacratlc
tarpuolic -< I—Dm)
a. BvaaXalt lelaarf. Ethiopia
t. fan Louis. lUarit
7. Bass Due, Irae,
12, CMltMll (Mono*f>.
U. ». IUJo»u














Tho Soviet preoenco la Soaelle began In 1968. la the eerly 1970a,
tha Soviets began aa elaoec conacanc presence La Berber* anj used
thla port for fleet loelotlcel support, Berber* renalned a for-
vara baaa aupportlng the Indian Oceaa Squadron until 1977, when
tba Somalia avlcted tha Soviets because of the letter's support.
ef Ethiopia In tha Ethloplen-Soaalt War. r\« loaa of thvse fsc-
llltlea vat a setback for tha Sovlete. Tha alternative faclllclea
staBS) developed IB Ethiopia vara less Ideally located than berbere,
fort vielta Co Adea vara significant ae early aa 1969 and vara
quite heavy in tna early 1970a, Indlcstlr.g chat tha «err va*
aaed to eupport tba lodlaa Ocean Squadron. Vlalta Incrcaseu
•(Cat tha Soviet •apulaloa froa Soaalta, reflecting, tha lo-
flatlcal t-aobleaa aaeocleted vltb tha loaa ot Barbara.
Tha lataaaa nasal activity at thla Island ladlcataa that tha
Soviet* ara devaloalag a logistical baaa here for support to
the^r squadron. Thla baaa should provide cha soaa degree of
support that larbara did. aXtboaah Ohalaa. Is oat aa ideally
lacatast.
This activity reflect* Soviet aaalatance la clearing Bengali
aorta, which had been daauaed during tha Iodo-Paklacanl War.
It doea not appear that tha Soviet Navy vaa granted conceaslona
(or thla aaalatance, since chars have been no port visits to
ainca 1974.
This activity reflects Soviet aiaeclearlng of tba Gulf of Sues
la 197a. Bo vielta have bean aeda to the port since the opere-
tta* vat coapleted, end' no vlalta have been made to Egypt alnca
tna aagaalaloa la 1*7*.
Cooe) vtll/opers tlcnal vialce, which began In 1967 and vera la
aopport of naval operaclona in the eouthern Indian Ocean,
Cood will/operational vlelte, probably to maintain Soviet
influence end ea oecaelonnl naval preeence In the Perslen Culf,
Tbeae vielta lad to speculation that tha Soviet* were develop-
lag a forward baee in Iraq, but there la little evidence to
auoport ouch apeculatlon.
tea entry 7.
Cood will/operational vielta. vhich began In 1962.
Coast sill/opersclcnal visits froa 1963 to 1977. Tha** visit*
aa Cha Soviata vara assailed froa Barbara* (Saa entry I,)
Cood vill/operetlonal vlalta. vhich began la 196*.
10.
Official *n4 good vill/onaraclonal visit*, which bagaa In 1965.
Hany *f theae vara for participation In Ethloolaa Navy Duy, a
holiday of coneiderable regional alcnlf lcanc*. Thee* vielc*
liraa sari fraquenc In 19/9. when Che -ovists, ee e reeulc of
their ***l*t*nc* to th* Harxisc Ethiopian aovernnettt in lta war
•rich Soaalia, began uaing Ethiopia to aupporc tbalr Indian
Ocoao Squadron,
Thaaa vialce, vhich begea la 1961, beceaa acre frequent In 1976,
soeslbly refleccing Sovlec aaalatance to tba Teaaai Bavy,
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TABLE V (Cont. )
7o« Tool Ship Dero
IS. eeaab, Ethiopia 2»
1*. Hoaeaaa, Kenya 1JO
17. Tlctorta, Seycbellaa 13*
1». Kaputo, Monanelqoa lit
1*. Mala, Maldlea telaade 12B
10. Karachi, 7ableran lOt
u. Bandar 'Abhaa, Iran 101




M. Kedrae, India St
u. lacala, Moaanbleae At
It. Oar aa Salaaa, TaaaaBla W
n. fart Sudan, Sodaa 32
n. Djibouti, Territory of Afara
aod laaaa
32
2t. Vlahakhapacnaa, Xadla a
VI. TaaataTe, Kelagaey lapubllc 2*
31. Cochin. India a
32. Hlal' al-AhaadX a
31. lerealca, Egypt IS
3*. laaalbar, Tanzania to
33. Khawr al .'»7i. lime,
M. Dotal, united Arab Salraeea
37. aefaga, Egypt
3*. ferla laland. People'. Deaacratlc
lapubllc of Taaaa
3*. lea Shukhelr, Egypt
Good will /operational Tlalta, which bagam la 1977.
Caed will/operational rt.lt.. which began la lt6«.
Otftelal aad gone) wlll/oparatloaal Tlalta, which bagaa la 1567.
Coed vlll/opaTatlaaal rUlta froa 1477 onward, poaalbly a aho*/ euppert for Noaaablqaa.
Coed wUl/oparatloual rinti froaj lt«t onward.
Official aad goad wlll/oparatlaaal alalia, which bagaa la 19M.
Coed will /operational Tlalta fro* 1964 te 197*.
Sea entry It.
Coed wiU/oper.tioeel rt.it.. which bagaa la 197:.
Good vlll/opmtlomal Tlalta, which bagaa la 196*.
tea entry It.
Good will/operational wlatta, which bagaa la 196t.
Cood wlll/oparatlOBal Tlalta, which began la 1969.
Coed wlll/oparatlonal Tlalta. which bagaa la 197S.
Cood vtll/operatloaal Tlalta la 1970 aod 1973.
Caed will/operational Tlalta, which began la 1961.
Cood wlll/eparatloaal Tlalta In 197b aad 19*0.
Cood will/operational Tlalta la 1969 and 1970.
Official aad goad will/operational Tlalta la 196*.
Cood will/operational Tlalt In 1969.
Cood will/operational Tlalt la 1973.
Cood wUl/eparatlonal Tlalta, which bagaa la 1976.
Cood will/operational Tlalt la 1969.
Operation.! Tlalt la 1979.




SNIOS CUMULATIVE SHIP-DAYS IN PORT BY COUNTRY,
1962-1980
Country Total Ship Daya
1. SomIU 6,199
2. Ethiopia 4,812
3. People's Democratic JUpubllc 4,623
•( Imi (South Teaan)
4. ssnglsdesh 3,920
3. Efjpt (Red S«. coast only) 1,399
«. Ira., 1,386
7. KsoTltlos 963
$. Sri Lanka 34S
9. India 374
10. Kosaoblqua 261




14. Kaldlve Islands 120
15. Pakistan 109
16. Iran 101
17. terjuelen Islands 77
1*. Tanisnla 38
19. Sodan 32
20. Tsrricory ol Afars and Issaa 32
21. Kalagaar Republic 24
22. Kuwait 21















Drsnoyrtsents begin; force Ink
show marked seasonal variation.
Force levels rise;
dons cohUiiim; fore* also lam
mittentry augmented by units
transiting from Soviet Western
fteeti via Cape of Good Hop*
(o Pacific Fleet.
Beak pattern continues.
Seasonal variations end; fore*
levels stable except during LLS.
aircraft earner deployments,
when force is augmented by
cruise-missile submarines.
Basic pattern contin tes; force
now usually include 10 units
from Sov.e! Western fleets which,
having transited the Suez Canal,
operate in Indian Ocean lor 4-5
months before ultimately tnraa-
fernug to Pacific Fleet.
Force generally composed of 1-1 SSM-
armed surface combataeitt and 1 SAM-
or eun-enrted destroyer; gun-armed
cruiser occasionally present; Foxtrot'
dass attack submarines deploy In
•unlet montha from Oct 1968;
presence of POL ships inlermsttetlt.
Amphibious ship deployments begta
Sep 1969 SSMarmcd submarines
begm penodK deproymeaa tame
month.
Neai-continuous SSM armed surface
cotnbalafli deployments end Jul 1970;
coniuiuous T 58 minesweeper deploy-
ments begin Oct l970;recon«aisaajhDt
overflights by USSR-based aircraft
begin 1970. POL ship presence be-
comes continuous.
Kyn-clais barracks and repair ship
snivel bcibcta tX.t 1972: continuous
fiMrfnif-cliH subntaniM deployments
begin spring 1973, continuous /Vow*
class escort ship dcploymenu begin
Mar 1973.
Near-cnnftnuous /Imur-claas repair
ship deployments nrcin Feb 1974;
8.500 Ion floating diydock stiives
Berbera Dec 197S; 11-38 ASW air-
craft begin deploying to Somalia
Apt 197S;Tu-9SDs follow in Oct
1976; period* intelligence coUectear
drraloyrncals beurg ***y 1974*
v>r*ciaea oarracka ship returns to
Vladivostok Oct/Nov 1 97*.
Oc sot iccivJe .cuviue. o. mij *HpK»>- la t»t» «» %M Un Cwaf «i t~» tar i
><a*at-«»llT Jit»iMJaTKJi liitnuiu Ve,
tssseasaruvj eras Satrap *av>
Poeoa Aetrvtfy
Activity lewis low; very Utile or ••
shore support: deployments teen fa
four months In duration.
Basic pattern cootlmvea.
Basic pattern continues ; SM-
srmed submarine deployments row
keyed to VS. aircraft earner deploy-
Ma iot expansion of Berbera
facilities begins Isle 1977; tigra-
flcsntly gteatet shore support
provided: sversge length of de-
ployments mote than doubles
to 8-9 months each, while
basic activity level remains low.
Amur-rial repair ship in Berbers)
almost continuously since Feb
1974; aerial iccunnsnsance and
ASW activity increases, logistic
support occasionally provided by
Black Sea float unite pataatvt




Activity becomes concentrated In north-
west quadrant of Indian Ocean; primarily
off Socotrs Island and Cspe GuardafuL
Basic pattern continues, with heavy use
of snehotages near Seychelles and
Diego Garcia during Indo-Pakistani War.
Basic pattern continues as la 1969-1970.
Minor combatant or Inlelligence collector
assumes patrol in Si rails of Hormuz May
1974, inicmuiieni surface combatant
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